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TO PRODUCE OR TO BUY? EXPLORING DETERMINANTS OF LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT PRIVATIZATION DECISIONS 
 
The U.S. is experiencing the worst recession since the Great Depression. All levels of 
government have been hit really hard, this is especially apparent at the local level since 
services provided at the local level are woven into people’s daily life. Thus, how to “do 
more with less” is more urgent than ever before. The use of privatization came to surface 
as a sound solution for deficit-plagued governments as it is thought to be more cost 
effective and outperform the public sector in most cases. This dissertation contains two 
empirical chapters that examine determinants of privatization and specify the conditions 
under which it is optimal to buy and under which it is optimal to produce in-house. 
 
Chapter two explores determinants that contribute to the use of privatization at the local 
level in the U.S. This chapter incorporates spatial technique to perform the analysis, 
which is a different approach from much of the literature. Empirical results indicate that a 
local government’s sourcing decision is affected by its nearby local jurisdictions. 
External stakeholders’ involvement contributes to the use of outsourcing, whereas having 
a limited supply of service providers impedes it.  
 
Chapter three applies a transaction cost economics (TCE) framework complemented with 
a revenue volatility measure to disentangle the mechanisms that drive public services’ 
outsourcing decisions. Results suggest that, in general, services with higher asset 
specificity and higher contract management difficulty are less likely to be outsourced, 
and a robust and competitive market facilitates the use of outsourcing.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Privatization is a broad term; it can be defined differently when facing different 
situations. In most of the world, privatization means transferring a business, enterprise, 
agency, service or property from the public sector to private hands. This is a phenomenon 
where lots of state-owned enterprises existed. In the U.S., privatization often refers to 
taking services that are supplied by the government and delivering them through private 
provision, either through a business that operates for a profit or through a non-profit 
organization. Although privatization is a worldwide phenomenon, it is often 
controversial. This chapter provides an overview of privatization and the bases of this 
study. The first section briefly introduces privatization in general, including the 
magnitude of privatization. Section II overviews privatization arguments in the U.S. The 
following section (III) explains the rationale behind the dissertation. Why do we care to 
study the use of privatization? The last section (IV) outlines organization of the 
dissertation.    
1.1. Privatization at a Glance 
 
Since the 1980s, governments have tended to purchase more services than before 
from external actors (i.e. other governments, non-profit sectors, and private firms) to 
maintain government activities and provide essential public goods and services, such as 
education, defense, utilities, infrastructure, and public health (Hoekman, 1998). This 
trend has mushroomed all around the world since then, from developed countries like the 
U.S., Japan, Great Britain, and France to less developed countries like China, Sri Lanka 
and Turkey. The trend has made governments more “commercial-enterprises-like” and 
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encouraged the development of competitive market economies within procurement 
systems (Moe, 1987).  
In addition, expenditures for government procurement tend to consume a 
considerable share of a country's gross domestic product (GDP). Specifically, McAfee 
and McMillan (1988) estimate this share to be 10% in the 1980s, whereas Auriol 
indicates 18% in 2002 (Auriol, 2006). Its significant purchasing power has made 
government a key consumer of goods and services at international, national, and sub-
national levels. 
Audet (2002) provides an excellent summary for the magnitude of government 
procurement. Some of his estimates of the size of government procurement markets by 
OECD countries (more than 130 countries are examined) are presented here (expressed as 
percentage of 1998 GDP data or in billions of US dollars): 
For OECD member countries as a whole, the ratio of total procurement 
(consumption and investment expenditure) for all levels of government is 
estimated at 20.0% or $4,773 billion and for non-member countries the ratio is 
estimated at 14.5% or $816 billion. 
 
Central and sub-central governments and state-owned enterprises are major 
purchasing forces that consume goods and services. However, many government 
procurers favor domestic suppliers by imposing all kinds of limitations on outside bidders 
or international sellers (i.e. by using a price preference policy), setting thresholds that 
virtually exclude outside/international bidders, or simply banning international bidders. 
Moreover, most sub-national government procurement activities are based on officials’ 
discretion. Those limitations, according to Audet (2002), increase government spending 
and hinder economic efficiency. Despite the limitations identified here, government 
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procurement and outsourcing rocketed since the 1980s. And there are several different 
forms of contracts to fulfill procurements. 
The prevailing form for government procurement is the fixed-price contract. The 
price of the contract is predetermined unless the situation changes. The benefits of this 
form of contracting are manifold. First, fixed price contracts transfer the risk to the 
contractors; second, they facilitate cost control for governments; third, they provide 
incentives for contractors to minimize the cost because the money contractors save is the 
money contractors earn. However, the drawback for such contracts is obvious too. 
Considering most contractors are profit driven, they may cut corners to save on cost in a 
way to maximize their profit. As such, a capable monitoring sector/agency is needed to 
ensure the quality of goods or services.  
Contrary to a fixed price contract is a cost-plus contract. There are three types of 
cost-plus contracts: cost plus fixed fee (a pre-determined fee will be given in addition to 
the cost); cost plus award fee (award fee is based on the performance); cost plus 
percentage of cost (fee rises as the total cost rise). There are both pros and cons 
associated with cost-plus contracts. The positive side would be that there is little 
incentive for contractors to minimize cost, presumably decreasing the probability for 
contractors to cut corners, thus possibly increasing quality and performance. The negative 
side is that cost-plus contracts require extra oversight and administration to ensure the 
money is well spent; further, there is no need to be cost-effective from a contractor’s 
point of view, so the waste of resources and energy is more likely to occur (Bajari and 
Tadelis, 2001).  
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1.2. Privatization in the U.S. 
 
In the United States, as a way to improve the city government’s performance, 
Savas (2000), who worked as a New York City official, began recommending contracting 
with private firms as a pragmatic policy to break up municipal monopolies and thereby 
improve the cost-effectiveness of municipal services. In addition, Savas, as one of 
America’s staunchest advocates of privatization, claims that the benefits for adopting 
privatization are manifold. These would include such things as reducing the cost of 
government and government debt, generating revenues, supplying infrastructure that 
government cannot provide, bringing in specialized skills for advanced activities and 
initiating or expanding a service quickly. The key to achieve all of those benefits, 
however, is competition. Savas (2000) believes competition could create an environment 
for better prices, innovation, choices, and alternatives. 
By comparison, opponents of privatization like Terry (2005), Milward, Provan and 
Else (1993), argue that overuse of privatization could result in a “hollow state”. The 
concept “the hollow corporation” was used to describe a new and more flexible model for 
business entities first seen in the 1980s. For instance, sports giant Nike did not directly 
manufacture its product. Instead, it outsourced all of its products, thus giving the idea of 
the Hollow Corporation (Tao, 2011). In the public sector, the hollow state is formed 
when provisions are made for services to be provided by sub-governments or non-
governmental agencies on behalf of the government and in the government’s name. Thus, 
it requires “public managers to develop special competencies and skills to effectively 
function” (Rosenbloom, 2004).  The direct problem associated with this is that most 
public administrators are trained for serving in the public sector, rather than managing 
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contracts and overseeing contractors. Furthermore, hollow states raise questions about 
democratic accountability and the capacity of the state to carry out the remainder of its 
duties, thus exacerbating “the erosion of public confidence in government”. This is 
“thinning” of administrative institutions (Terry, 2005). In practice, more drawbacks of 
using privatization have been identified over time. For example, a) not fully specified 
contracts and public officials’ negligence lead to misunderstanding and disputes; b) 
public officials fail to conduct a competitive procurement process, thus giving some 
contractors advantages; c) lack of a solid base for performance measurement, thereby 
providing loopholes for service providers to cut corners and lower service quality; d) 
incumbent providers enjoy and exploit monopoly status due to the fact that the market is 
less competitive once past initial procurement; and e) privatization is subject to strong 
public employee opposition in certain areas (Savas, 2000; Terry, 2005; Tao, 2011; 
Rosenbloom, 2004), which might or might not be purely self-interested. 
Despite all the criticisms toward privatization, the United States has experienced a 
boom in using privatization in recent decades. Figure 1.1 shows trends in local 
government service provision since 1982. It is apparent that services provided through 
the public sector have declined from 68.8% to 47.2% from 1988 to 2007. In the 
meantime, the use of private provision has boosted from 25.8% to 41.7%. The use of 
privatization further breaks down to the service privatized to profit firms or non-profit 
organizations (green line) and service contracted out to another local government (red 
line). Although the use of private provision has been growing in both sectors, services 
that are contracted out to private companies and non-profit organizations account for a 
larger portion of the services privatized.  
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Moreover, the use of outsourcing has become a commonplace across all service 
areas among local jurisdictions. Figure 1.2 shows service provision by different service 
groups. The data are obtained from the International City County Management 
Association Alternative Service Delivery (ICMA ASD) 2007 survey. The survey asked 
the service sourcing decisions on 67 individual services, which are grouped into six 
categories: public works/transportation, public utilities, public health and safety, parks 
and recreation, cultural and arts programs and support services (details about each service 
area will be presented in Chapter 3).  
Figure 1.1: Trends in Local Government Service Provision 
 
Source: International City/County Management Association (ICMA) Alternative Service Delivery (ASD) 
Survey 
It is obvious that the use of outsourcing is widespread across all six groups. The 
majority of services in public health and safety and cultural and arts programs are 
delivered through private provision. It seems counter intuitive that large portion of public 
health and safety services are outsourced. The truth is, some of the heavily outsourced 
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services, such as vehicle towing and storage, operation of animal shelters, operation of 
daycare facilities, drug and alcohol treatment programs, are all listed in public health and 
safety group. By comparison, a large portion of services in parks and recreation, and 
support services is still provided/produced in-house, whereas, public provision and 
private service vendors split the services in public works/transportation and public 
utilities.   
Figure 1.2: Service Provision by Service Area 
 
Source: International City/County Management Association (ICMA) Alternative Service Delivery (ASD) 
2007 Survey 
 
In short, I have briefly introduced the term privatization and the arguments around 
it. The first section looks at the issue from a global point of view and the second section 
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outlines the use of privatization in the U.S. The following illustrates the rationale behind 
the dissertation. 
1.3. Why Do We Care 
 
The U.S. is experiencing the worst recession since the Great Depression. All levels 
of government have been hit really hard. This is especially apparent at the local level 
since services provided at the local level are woven into people’s daily life.  
If city budgets were bundled together, Hoene projected a shortfall ranging from 
$56 billion to $83 billion from 2010-2012 (Hoene, 2009). Table 1.1 gives a rough 
estimate based on different levels (3%, 4%, and 5%) of the budget shortfall. With a 3% 
projected shortfall, cities all together were facing a $34 billion budget gap over the three-
year period (2010-2012). A 4% and 5% shortfall would burden the cities with total of $46 
billion and $53 billion shortfall respectively over the same period.   
Table 1.1: Projected Municipal Sector Budget Shortfall, 2010-2012 (All $ in 1,000s) 
Year 3% Shortfall 4% Shortfall 5% Shortfall 
2010 $ 11,933,408 $ 15,911,210 $ 19,889,013 
2011 $ 11,575,406 $ 15,274,762 $ 18,894,562 
2012 $ 11,228,143 $ 14,663,772 $ 14,359,867 
Total $ 34,736,957 $ 45,849,744 $ 53,143,443 
Source: City Budget Shortfalls and Responses, Hoene 2009 
Moreover, a number of local jurisdictions have already filed for bankruptcy or 
declared financial emergency. Figure 1.3 shows a map of municipal bankruptcies. Cities, 
towns and counties are shown in red. Utility authorities and other municipalities are 
displayed in black. Since January 2010, a total of 31 municipalities filed for bankruptcy.  
As suggested by all the statistics shown above, the financial challenges faced by 
local communities are present and severe. How to “do more with less” is more urgent 
than ever before. For many elected officials, privatization came to surface as a perfect 
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solution for deficit-plagued governments as it is thought to be more cost effective, and 
private and non-profit organizations are thought to outperform the public sector in most 
cases. Municipalities turn to private provision to deliver public services as a means to 
reduce cost and cushion the financial uncertainty. 
Figure 1.3: Municipal Bankruptcies Map: Bankruptcies Since 2010 (Cities, towns and counties 
are shown in red. Utility authorities and other municipalities are displayed in gray.) 
 
Source: Bankrupt Cities, Municipalities List and Map. Available at: http://www.governing.com/gov-
data/municipal-cities-counties-bankruptcies-and-defaults.html 
 
Although there is no systematic evidence on the cost difference between public 
provision and private provision, there is ample anecdotal evidence for this viewpoint. For 
example, when Chicago delivered its towing services to haul away abandoned cars 
through a private company, the net annual savings were estimated at $2.5 million. 
Similarly, a private hospital took over the South Florida State Psychiatric Hospital, which 
was once considered as a dumping ground and patients were treated poorly. The private 
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hospital not only improved the conditions and service quality, but also it appears that it 
was profitable after just one year of operation (Rosen and Gayer, 2009).   
Opponents argue, on the other hand, that service contractors tend to “cream” clients 
off: provide services to clients who are easy to treat and most likely to succeed, whereas 
high cost, low profit clients are referred to public agencies. Kamerman and Kahn (1989) 
investigated childcare programs privatized in North Carolina and confirmed that higher 
efficiency is achieved by “creaming off” the easier and less costly cases and reducing the 
service level provided. Similarly, Bendick (1989) argues cost reductions are obtained 
from the lower quality services that are provided to clients. Those examples show a key 
counter argument to the use of private production: “private contractors produce inferior 
products” (Rosen and Gayer, 2009).  
As such, it is obvious that outsourcing or private provision of services is beneficial 
only if the claimed benefits are obtained and service quality is not inferior compared to 
services provided through public provision. Therefore, it is critical to understand the 
determinants that drive the use of privatization forward. Moreover it is essential to 
understand how to properly specify the conditions under which it is optimal to buy and 
under which it is optimal to produce in-house, so that when a city decides to outsource, it 
can claim the benefits (i.e. cost saving, improved performance) and avoid hazardous 
outcomes (i.e. inferior service quality, pay dispute, corruption, pension scandal). Having 
specified the desirable conditions, it is important to see if cities contract in accord with 
those conditions. That is exactly what this dissertation investigates. The next section 
outlines the structure of the dissertation.  
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1.4. Organization of the Dissertation 
 
After this brief introduction, the following chapters survey the issues listed above. 
Chapter 2 investigates the determinants of the U.S. local governments’ privatization 
decisions and examines whether there are any spatial interdependencies for privatization 
policies. Chapter 3 applies a transaction cost economics (TCE) framework complemented 
with a revenue volatility measure to analyze sourcing decisions. The last chapter offers a 
concluding discussion. 
 The second chapter, “Determinants of Privatization in U.S. Municipalities – New 
Evidence from a Spatial Study” reviews the existing literature in the field and identifies 
that there is no general consensus explaining why the use of outsourcing is so prevalent 
across the local jurisdictions in the U.S. In addition, I observe that there is a clear spatial 
pattern in the use of outsourcing. As such, in an effort to fill in the gap, I incorporate a 
spatial factor to identify determinants of the use of outsourcing and explores spatial 
interdependencies that may existed in the sourcing decisions at municipal level.   
The following essay, “Produce or Buy? – An Analysis of Government Procurement 
from Transaction Cost and Revenue Volatility Perspective” responds to the tough 
economic recession that the U.S. has recently experienced. The essay combines the 
analytical framework of Traction Cost Economy (TCE) and the concept of revenue 
volatility to disentangle the conditions under which it is optimal to buy and under which 
it is optimal to produce in-house. Cities that take these conditions into account would be 
better equipped when they decide to outsource services to cut cost and cushion financial 
instability. Analysis in this essay focuses on TCE characteristics such as asset specificity, 
contract management difficulty, and market competiveness. And both long term revenue 
12 
 
volatility and short term revenue volatility measures are used to capture the fiscal stress 
level at local level.  
In sum, the final chapter concludes the dissertation with the findings from each 
essay. Policy implications and arenas for future research are also discussed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Zhiwei Zhang 2013  
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Chapter 2. Determinants of Privatization in U.S. Municipalities  
– New Evidence from a Spatial Study 
 
Privatization reduces the role of government by increasing the role of other 
organizations, such as non-profit organizations and private businesses. As Savas (2000) 
puts it, privatization relies more on the private institutions of society and less on 
government to satisfy people’s needs. Although this concept is not new to America, the 
fight over the 2012 Republican Medicare privatization proposal certainly brought 
privatization to the forefront again. Advocates and opponents fiercely debate whether or 
not to increase the pace of outsourcing government provided services. There are 
numerous scholars who have devoted their research to such phenomena; a general 
consensus about what to privatize and how to properly privatize is yet to be reached. 
Despite the lack of consistency in the literature, one commonly held view is that 
privatization injects competition into the public sector and thus sparks innovative and 
better policies (Bouche and Volden, 2011).   
On another corner of public policy research, policy diffusion theorists are 
interested in finding out how innovative policies diffuse, and how subnational 
governments learn and interact with each other. One of the earliest studies that focused 
on diffusion is a seminal book “Diffusion of Innovations” written by Everett Rogers 
(1962). In the book, Rogers introduces how new ideas and technology spread among 
members of a social system. The book summarizes four key elements that could affect 
diffusion of a new idea, which are innovation, communication channels, time and a social 
system. Innovation is defined as “an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new by 
an individual or other unit of adoption" (Rogers, 1983; p. 11). Communication channels 
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are “the means by which messages get from one individual to another" (Rogers, 1983; p. 
17). Time is defined differently based on the different perspectives: "The innovation-
decision period is the length of time required to pass through the innovation-decision 
process" (Rogers, 1983; p. 21) and "Rate of adoption is the relative speed with which an 
innovation is adopted by members of a social system" (Rogers, 1983; pp. 21, 23). Based 
on those elements, a new idea or technology spreads among five types of adopters: 
innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority and laggards. All the concepts 
and elements introduced in this book are still widely incorporated into empirical diffusion 
studies.  
Innovation and better policies are key elements for both privatization and diffusion 
research.  It is the aim of this paper to fill in part of the gap; I propose to investigate 
determinants of privatization and discover whether there are any spatial 
interdependencies for privatization policies. The paper is organized as follows: the first 
section outlines theoretical considerations and a brief literature review of both 
privatization research and spatial studies. In addition, a set of studies that combine 
privatization and policy diffusion will also be identified. Section 2 specifies the model 
and variable selections. Section 3 presents empirical results and discussion around it. 
Concluding remarks follow. 
2.1 Theoretical Considerations and Literature Review 
 
Privatization is a choice among alternative ways of providing city services. If city 
leaders are rational in their decision processes, the choice of whether to provide a service 
directly or contract it out would depend on a consideration of how well each approach 
would serve diverse goals: effectiveness of service, efficiency of delivery, responsiveness 
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to citizens. Attention to these goals lead to the result that “much of the work on urban 
services in more recent years has focused on patterns of services delivery and on efforts 
to improve the quality, responsiveness, and effectiveness, as well as efficiency, of a local 
government services” (Ammons, 2003; p. 254). Because of the complexity of the policy 
formation process, I break down the theory into three sub-sections: state-local relations, 
local governments’ economic, political, and social environment, and spatial 
interdependencies.  
2.1.1 State-Local Relations 
 
Local governments are not mentioned in the U.S. Constitution and are regarded as 
creatures of the states. Thereby, local governments are subjected to the legal control of 
the states. A city charter, which is a document that is analogous to a constitution at the 
national or state level, assigns municipal authority. Nice and Fredericksen (1995) provide 
a brief introduction to city charters:  
The fundamental law of a city is its charter. The charter specifies the 
structure of city government, including what officials it will have, how 
they will be chosen, and what powers they will possess. The charter also 
indicates what programs a city may operate, and specifies city boundaries, 
along with a variety of other provisions. (Nice and Fredericksen, 1995; 
p.149) 
Although there are different charters (i.e. special act charter1, general act charter2, 
and classified charter3
                                               
1 The special act charter requires the state legislature to draft an individualized charter for each city. 
) states use to regulate local governments, most states consider the 
needs and scale of cities when they draft charters. Large and more populous cities tend to 
be assigned with more authorities and more service responsibilities by charters. And thus, 
2 The General act charter applies to all of the cities in the state.  
3 The classified charter defines cities of a state into classes, usually by population, and a charter is drafted 
for each class of cities. 
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it is reasonable to think that scale and locations of a city may affect the use of 
privatization. 
In the article “The determinants of variations in local service contracting: garbage 
in, garbage out?” Boyne (1998) examined 12 empirical studies of city contracting out 
conducted from 1981 to 1996. With respect to the relationship between population and 
procurement activities, one-quarter of the results favor the finding that smaller local 
governments are more likely to use external contractors, while another one-third of the 
results suggest that contracting out is more common in large authorities.  
Due to the inconsistency, Boyne suggests that the population size is an 
inappropriate measure of the scale of service production. Since the service outputs 
fluctuate greatly across areas with the same population size, their socioeconomic 
characteristics and political preferences may play more important roles in determining 
procurement decisions. In addition, large cities tend to have more services responsibilities 
than small cities. Therefore, a positive coefficient for a population variable may simply 
indicate that there are more services available to contractors, thus increase the possibility 
of outsourcing, not that population per se is important. (Boyne, 1998)  
One the other hand, location likely serves as a determinant for privatization. 
According to the Census Bureau, cities are categorized as central, suburban, and 
independent. Central cities generally have a broader scope of functional responsibility, as 
assigned by city charters. By comparison, suburbs are commonly defined as the 
residential areas that surround the metropolitan area. In the United States, suburbs have 
usually detached single-family homes. And I am aware there is a considerable diversity 
among suburbs now, including commercial centers and industrial centers. I only focus on 
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residential suburbs for simplicity reason. Residential suburbs normally have a degree of 
political autonomy, and most have lower population density than inner city 
neighborhoods. So the suburban cities are privileged to have choice on how to deliver 
municipal services (i.e. they could utilize services by working in inter-governmental 
manner, or contracting with private, for-profit or nonprofit firms, or accomplishing 
services by themselves) (Thompson, 2000). 
Based on the 1988 ICMA survey on privatization, Greene (1996) used data for 188 
medium-sized cities to test the relationship between metropolitan status and contracting. 
Greene found that as the value of metro status4
As states enjoy legal control over local governments, it is the responsibility of a 
local official to provide and maintain public services at the municipal level. Once a 
charter defines a city’s authorities and obligations, it is up to local officials to make 
policy decisions. The next section explores to what extent the choice of service delivery 
approach depends on the economic, political, and social environment. 
 increased, privatization levels also 
increased which supported the hypothesis that privatization levels were higher in 
suburban cities. 
2.1.2 Local Governments’ Economic, Political and Social Environment 
 
No matter how much state governments (i.e. through charter) can define or confine 
local governments’ functionality, it is the job of local officials to provide sound and 
viable public services to their citizens. Because of the complex nature of the policy 
formation process, there are a large number of factors that need to be taken into 
consideration before reaching a policy outcome. 
 
                                               
4 1=Central; 2=Suburban; 3=Independent. 
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Political Factors 
Empirical evidence suggests political factors have influenced privatization in 
various ways. Political factors refer to citizens’ preference for the size and role of 
government, reflected in the political ideology and partisanship of citizens and elected 
officials (Morgan, 1988).  The strong desire for small and efficient government was a 
main contributor to privatization. Strong public resistance to tax increases and public 
employees’ opposition to privatization could be other factors that contribute to the use of 
privatization.  
At the same time, the evidence on the consequences of privatization is mixed and it 
is often subject to ideological dispute as conservative activists sing the praises of the 
private sector and liberal groups charge that privatization leads to social inequity and a 
hollowing out of the state that leaves it unable to act effectively in addressing public 
problems and providing public goods. However, Warner and Hebdon, in their analysis of 
local government restructuring in the state of New York, argued that they found no 
evidence indicating that either Democratic or Republican Party membership influenced 
the extent of government privatization or of more complex forms of restructuring 
(Warner, 2001). 
Bounded Rationality and Fiscal Stress 
Earlier literature made the assumption that people are rational and behave 
accordingly. A more appropriate version for understanding the decision-making that 
developed later on is bounded, or limited, rationality model. Bounded rationality implies 
that in decision-making, rationality of individuals is subjected to the information they 
have, the limited cognitive processing capacities and the finite amount of time they have 
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to make a decision (Jones, 1994). Based on the idea of bounded rationality, Baumgartner 
and Jones (1993) developed the punctuated equilibrium social theory. The theory states 
that the policy cycle is consistent with an extended period of stability, which is later 
punctuated by sudden shifts in policy change. There are several reasons for such a 
phenomenon. First and foremost is because of limited rationality. Policy makers tend to 
leave policies that run relatively smoothly untouched until large, though less frequent, 
changes happen.  
In the context of privatization, a fiscal shortfall does exactly that. When a fiscal 
shortfall presents, local public officials need to step out of their comfort zone to find 
alternative ways of doing things. Because privatization is widely promoted as being less 
costly than direct provision, leaders are more likely to turn to it to stretch public dollars. 
The growth of contracting out in local government since the 1970s has been widely 
attributed to fiscal stress. Some scholars believe contracting out would be most prevalent 
in communities that suffer from the most severe financial pressures. They suggest local 
officials consider, and often respond to, fiscal problems by privatizing or utilizing 
intergovernmental arrangements to provide services (Dilger, 1997). Although this is a 
sound theoretical prediction, it does not mean empirical literature always support the 
belief.  
Brown and Potoski (2003) confirmed this theoretical argument by examining the 
data primarily drawn from the ICMA’s 1997 survey “Profile of Local Government 
Services Delivery Choices”. In addition, Morgan, and England (1988) claim “the choice 
of external over internal production is more common when… fiscal pressures are 
prominent”. Conversely, Greene (2002) points out the negative relationship between 
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fiscal stress and privatization level. Greene found that when fiscal stress decreased, 
privatization levels increased. Therefore, Greene argues that cities with high privatization 
levels tend to be wealthy and healthy fiscally. By comparison, Boyne (1998) found out 
that empirical evidence on the relationship between fiscal stress and contracting out is 
statistically insignificant. As we can see from here, the empirical evidence in the 
literature is quiet diverse. 
Managerial Factors 
Recently, more and more studies have begun to suggest that managerial 
considerations, for example market competitiveness and public officials’ ability to write 
comprehensive contracts and monitor contracting initiatives, have overcome political 
concerns as determinants of contracting for services (Fernandezet al., 2008). The reason 
for proposing the management capacity to ensure the success of privatization is that 
contracting out creates potential agency problems, such as adverse selection and moral 
hazard that result from information asymmetry and opportunism (Brown, 1995; Savas, 
2000; Brown, 2003).  
Based on the 2002-2003 ICMA survey responses, which consist of 985 
municipalities and 298 counties, Fernandez et al. (2008) examined three variables within 
the realm of managerial factors. The first is the ex ante analysis and planning efforts (ex 
ante management). The intention for this analysis is to test the feasibility of privatization. 
The second measure captures contract monitoring capacity (monitoring capacity), which 
contains the evaluation of citizen satisfaction, cost, and compliance with standards to 
evaluate private service delivery, and whether it employed citizen surveys, monitoring of 
citizen complaints, field observations, and analysis of data and records to evaluate private 
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service delivery. The third is a measure of external stakeholder involvement (external 
involvement). This measure indicates whether the external stakeholders were involved in 
studying the feasibility of privatization: potential service providers; professional 
consultants; service recipients/customers; managers in other local governments; citizen 
advisory committees; and state agencies, leagues, and associations. Privatization was 
expected to be positively correlated with the factors mentioned above. And the findings 
do uphold the positive relationship for ex ante management and contracting out as well as 
monitoring capacity with privatization. External stakeholder involvement, however, 
failed to achieve statistical significance. (Fernandez et al., 2008)   
Competitiveness  
Market theory suggests that a more robust and competitive market could yield 
more efficient outcomes, which also means more savings to the procurers. In addition, 
competition is thought to be a cure for potential agency problems such as adverse 
selection and moral hazard that result from information asymmetry and opportunism. 
Thus, competitiveness could be used as a good predictor for outsourcing practices.  
Empirically, Gupta tests how many bidders are required for these markets to be 
competitive based on the highway construction industry in Florida. Gupta has shown that 
bid prices fall as the number of bidders increases; more specifically, a minimum of six to 
eight bidders is required to acquire the competitive threshold. Interestingly, Gupta notes 
that more than eight bidders will not make any difference (a market with 8, 50, or 500 
bidders will generate the same competitive price on average). Moreover, Dutta and John 
(1995) conduct experimental lab studies to examine the effect of number of suppliers on 
the supplier’s selling price. They recruited undergraduate business students playing the 
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role of electrical transformer suppliers. Results show sellers in a monopoly condition 
offer higher prices than in a duopoly condition. 
Those finding are consistent with market theory that competition could serve as a 
safe guard to reduce opportunism and balance information asymmetry. A more efficient 
and effective outcome could be expected when the market is competitive.  
The next section explores some of the findings in spatial studies and policy 
diffusion research. Although there are hundreds of articles published on spatial and 
policy diffusion studies during the past decades (Graham, Shipan and Volden, 2008), 
there are only a handful of articles that incorporate spatial factors into privatization 
research. Thus, I will first review spatial studies that are in broader settings, and then 
introduce a few sophisticated methods that have been developed along the road. And 
lastly, I identify spatial studies that specifically focus on privatization.  
2.1.3 Spatial Studies and Policy Diffusion 
 
Strategic interactions among governments have attracted numerous scholars from 
different disciplines. In public economics, most of the empirical works focus on how to 
properly specify and estimate reaction functions based on strategic interactions among 
jurisdictions. One major branch of spatial studies in public economics is spillover model. 
Spillover models include empirical studies that investigate proper environmental 
standards, yardstick competition and public expenditure spillovers (Brueckner, 2003).  
Spatial studies in political science and political economy are better known as policy 
diffusion research. The scholars in this area tend to be interested in the question “who, 
what, when, where, how, and why of policy diffusion” (Graham, Shipan, and Volden, 
2008). Policy diffusion is in vogue. A quick keyword search of “policy diffusion” in a 
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database, such as Web of Science and Google Scholar, provides hundreds of articles 
within a ten-year span. All those articles reside in the subfields of American politics, 
comparative politics, and international relations (Graham, Shipan, and Volden; 2008). 
Regardless of the discipline and models used, scholars believe a firm grasp on spatial 
studies and/or policy diffusion research could better enable us to understand the dynamics 
of policy making process and politics. Next, I review spatial studies and policy diffusion 
research accordingly.  
The spillover model generally assumes that a jurisdiction makes its decisions not 
only based on its own characteristics (i.e. income, grant, demographic and political 
characteristics); but also on the basis of the decisions made by other jurisdictions 
(Brueckner, 2003). Case, Hines, and Rosen (1994) are the first to test the spillover model 
empirically. The authors test the hypothesis that “a state’s spending depends on the 
spending of similarly situated states” (Case, Hines, and Rosen; 1994, p.286). Within the 
context, they replace the “similarly situated states” with “neighbors”. In the study, 
“neighbors” does not necessarily mean states located next to each other; it is more in a 
sense that two states are economically and demographically similar. The idea is that 
residents in one state benefit from public expenditure in other states. For example, in 
April 1984, Texas governor called for a special legislative session to increase school 
expenditures by a billion dollar because a study conducted by Department of Education 
found out Texas ranked at bottom when it comes to public education spending. Case, 
Hines, and Rosen (1994) estimated state-expenditure reaction functions and found that a 
state’s public expenditure is positively correlated with similarly situated states’ public 
expenditure, 70 cents to a dollar to be exact.  
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Yardstick competition stems from voters’ choices and incumbent behavior. The 
basic idea of yardstick competition is that voters care about what other jurisdictions do. If 
voters in jurisdiction A are skeptical about a tax increase, the incumbent will be reluctant 
to increase the tax even by a small amount because he/she is afraid the voter will vote 
him/her out of the office. However, if other jurisdictions are raising taxes, it might seem 
like a viable option for incumbent in jurisdiction A to raise the exact same tax. The logic 
is that taxpayers may deem the tax increase is appropriate because everybody else is 
doing it. This would create a “yardstick” competition between jurisdictions; the 
incumbent cares about what others are doing (Besley and Case, 1995). By analyzing the 
U.S. state data from 1960 to 1988, Besley and Case were able to confirm, “vote-seeking 
and tax-setting are tied together through the nexus of yardstick competition” (Besley and 
Case, 1995, p. 25). 
Public policy research, on the other hand, focuses more on how certain policies 
spread or diffuse over time. After a comprehensive literature search on policy diffusion 
research, Graham, Shipan and Volden (2008) survey hundreds of articles published over 
the past half-century. The authors find most policy diffusion studies are rooted in 
American politics, but there are also a considerable amount of studies that in international 
relations and comparative politics. While hundreds of empirical studies reviewed by the 
authors clearly indicate policies do diffuse, Graham, Shipan and Volden synthesize the 
literature to answer the question who, what, when, where, how and why policy diffuse. 
The study points out that which actors get involved in policy diffusion process is the key 
element for us to understand the foundation of policy adoption. All in all, it is humans 
that make policy decisions. Actors are categorized into three groups: internal actors, 
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which are defined as “those in the governments that may be considering an innovation” 
or adoption (p.17). External actors are those “in an external government that has already 
adopted a policy” (p.18). And go-betweens belong to neither groups mentioned above. 
But they have links to both groups in some way.  
Those three sets of actors utilize policy diffusion through four channels: learning, 
competition, coercion and socialization. Learning and competition are self-explanatory. 
Jurisdictions are likely to adopt a policy deemed to be successful. Competition can lead 
to diffusion of policies with positive or negative economic spillovers across jurisdictions. 
Policy adoption, in most cases, is voluntary and passive. Policy coercion, on the other 
hand, is “a process through which some set of actors attempt to impose their preferred 
policy solutions on another government” (p.26). Asymmetric power is the key element of 
the process. It does not matter if policy coercion is in a top-down/vertical setting (i.e. in 
the U.S., federal government has the power and authority to push through certain policy 
to state government) or in a horizontal setting (i.e. through sanctions or contingency 
contracts). Go-betweens are key players in this perspective. While policy coercion’s 
intention is to change policy directly, socialization is a more subtle way to change actors’ 
mindset. As Checkel defined, socialization is “a process of inducting actors into the 
norms and rules of a community” (Checkel, 2005; p.804). The results? No immediate 
policy change, but it may yield stabilized long term policy change. 
Berry and Berry (1999) review the dominant theories of government innovation in 
the public policy literature. Policy innovation is defined as a program that is new to the 
government adopting it. There are two principle forms of explanation for the adoption of 
a new program: internal determinants, which are factors leading a jurisdiction to innovate 
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are political, economic or social characteristics internal to the state; and diffusion models. 
National interaction model and regional diffusion model are two most prevalent models 
of diffusions. National interaction model assumes a national communication network 
among state officials regarding public sector programs in which officials learn about 
programs from their peers in other states. The probability that a state will adopt a 
program is thus proportional to the number of interactions its officials have had with 
officials of already-adopting states. The regional diffusion model is divided into two sub-
models: neighbor model and fixed-region model. The neighbor model describes states are 
influenced specifically by those states with which they share a border. The model 
assumes that each state has a unique set of reference points for cues on public-sector 
innovations. The fixed-region model assumes that the nation is divided into multiple 
regions and that states tend to emulate the policies of other states within the same region. 
The model presumes that all states within the same region experience the same channels 
of influence.  
In the study, Berry and Berry (1999) also introduce some other diffusion models. 
Leader-laggard models assume that certain states are pioneers in the adoption of a policy 
and that other states emulate these leaders. The idea for isomorphism models is that a 
state is most likely to take cues about adopting a new policy from other states that are 
similar, as these states provide the best information about the nature of the policy and the 
likely consequences of adopting it. Vertical influence models are very similar to policy 
coercion model introduced above.  
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The brief introduction about policy diffusion helps us understanding why and how 
policies diffuse conceptually; next I am going to survey some studies that could help us 
gain some understandings about policy diffusion empirically.  
Corresponding to Graham, Shipan and Volden’s study in 2008, Shipan and Volden 
(2008) investigate the role of the four mechanisms (learning, competition, imitation, and 
coercion) of policy diffusion in the choice of antismoking policies adopted by 675 largest 
U.S. cities between 1975 and 2000. After examining the record of adoption of any of 
three antismoking laws (restrictions on smoking in government buildings, restrictions on 
smoking in restaurants, and youth access restrictions) of 675 cities, Shipan and Volden 
confirm that a city is more likely to adopt a policy if the same policy is adopted broadly 
by other cities throughout the state, or its nearest bigger neighbor adopts the same policy, 
or there are positive spillovers from nearby cities. By comparison, a city is less likely to 
adopt a policy if there are negative economic spillovers from that adoption to nearby 
cities. They have also found that learning is enhanced in bigger cities; smaller cities are 
more concerned with economic competition; larger cities are less likely to rely on 
imitation; there is no effect with coercion-population interaction, that is, both large and 
small cities are coerced by the states in which they are situated. 
Berry and Berry’s (1990) seminal study of state lottery adoptions as policy 
innovations employed an Event History Analysis (EHA) to explain state policy makers’ 
decision behavior. When exploring the cause for a government to adopt a new program or 
policy, the literature back then offered either internal determinant models (i.e. political, 
economic, and social characteristics motivate policy adoption) or regional diffusion 
models (i.e. policy adoption decisions are influenced by nearby states). And those two 
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types of models do not offer insight to each other. Berry and Berry argue that these two 
views can be integrated together as a unified model to provide more reliable explanations. 
The authors use an EHA to perform the empirical investigation. Policy adoption, a lottery 
in this case, by a state is considered as an event. The dependent variable is binary. A risk 
set is defined as a state is coded 1 if it is “at risk” of enacting a lottery and 0 if the state 
has already done so. Because of the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, Probit 
estimation is applied to perform the analysis. Berry and Berry confirmed all of their core 
hypotheses, namely, both internal determinants and regional influence received strong 
support. More specifically, the more fiscal stress a state faces, the higher the probability 
to adopt a lottery. The lower the level of per capita income, the lower the probability of a 
lottery adoption. The more a state’s neighbors adopt the lottery, the higher probability of 
the state to adopt a lottery. The only exception is that unified party control was not 
statistically significant, but it makes sense because lotteries are not very controversial.   
 Berry and Berry’s intelligent contribution (i.e. adopting EHA) to the diffusion 
literature provided a new path for future research. By applying EHA, Mintrom (1997) 
tackles the diffusion of innovations from a different perspective: how the presence of 
policy entrepreneurs-“political actors who promote policy ideas” (Mintrom, 1997; 
p.738)-articulate policy innovations onto government agendas and energizes the diffusion 
process. Mintrom looks specifically at the approval of school choice, an idea that the 
schools can be chosen for children and not determined based on districts, for educational 
reform. The author creates a taxonomy of event history, which is very similar to Berry 
and Berry’s (1990) work, predicts the probability that a state considers the school choice 
at a specific time (i.e. hazard rate). Examining the data between 1987 and 1992, Mintrom 
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confirms that the presence of policy entrepreneurs increases the possibility that a state 
considers school choice and approval of school choice as a policy innovation.  
Volden (2006) builds directed dyad-year event history analysis, modified based on 
traditional state-year EHA, to examine policy changes in the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program from 1998 to 2001. Volden claims there are two limitations that typical EHA are 
subjected to. First, it is really hard for typical EHA to discern whether a perceived 
successful policy helped policy diffuse across states or not. Second, “rather than focus on 
whether a policy is adopted in the states, scholars may learn more about policy diffusion 
by focusing on which policy is adopted” (Volden, 2006; p.295). Directed dyad-year EHA 
helps to overcome those limitations by examining each pair of states in each year. 
Equipped with this new model, Volden confirms that successful and low cost policies are 
more likely to be adopted by other states.  
So far, all the articles reviewed cover lots of policy fields, ranging from tax 
competition and lottery adoptions to school choice. Although they are not directly related 
to the topic of this paper, they serve as an introduction to spatial studies and policy 
diffusion research, and also provide theoretical foundation for my own research. Next, I 
am going to review a small set of articles that are directly related to the core idea of this 
paper: the diffusion of privatization policy.  
Schmitt (2011) addresses what mechanisms lead to the diffusion of 
telecommunications privatization in the OECD world. In order to identify spatial 
interdependencies for privatization policies, Schmitt builds four different models that 
contain different weighting matrices. The first model uses an inverse distance weighting 
matrix. The second model uses a weight matrix combined with a dummy variable to see 
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if two countries share a common language. The third model captures the trade volume 
between two countries. And the last one uses annual turnover rate of the national 
telecommunications provider for the weight matrix. By examining a panel dataset for 18 
OECD countries between 1980 and 2007, Schmitt claims that spatial interdependency is a 
statistically significant indicator for telecommunications privatization. Countries that 
have similar geographical or economic conditions are more likely to adopt the same or 
similar policy. And the diffusion of privatization policy is highly correlated with the 
openness of the economy. However, countries with similar cultural background seem not 
to converge on adoption of privatization policies.  
Using a sample of 37 Latin American and OECD countries during the period 1980 
to 1997, Meseguer (2004) shows rational learning and especially emulation are two most 
important indicators for privatization decisions. Similarly, Livi-Faur points out policy 
transfer in Latin American countries is “emulative, coercive and simple” (Levi-Faur, 
2003; p.730), and in Europe country policy tends to spread horizontally from country to 
country due to the fact that European countries tend to emulate each other. Brooks (2005) 
studies pension privatization from 59 countries with a time span of 1980 to 1999. She 
reveals that horizontal transformation matters, “the decision to privatize pensions in one 
country is systematically linked to corresponding decisions made by governments in 
relevant peer nations” (Brooks, 2005; p.273). However, the strength of this peer dynamic 
differs around the world. Eastern European and Central Asian nations are more likely to 
adopt pension privatization if their peers have already done so. Peer dynamics are also 
highly correlated to policy adoption in Latin America, whereas the OECD world seems to 
ignore the peer coercion.  
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Bouche and Volden (2011) ask how four foster care policies spread across 384 
counties in five states between 1995 and 2006 and how public and private providers take 
them differently. In order to capture the full mechanisms of policy diffusion, Bouche and 
Volden hypothesized: (a) policy diffuses across counties where latecomers learn from 
early adopters, and (b) privatization increases the likelihood of adopting innovations 
since privatization injects competition into the public sector. The first hypothesis received 
partial support, only the learning mechanism (proportion of state population already 
covered) showed up as statistically significant. The privatization hypothesis received full 
support from the empirical results. Bouche and Volden found that “both public and 
privatized counties learn, and learn from the experiences of both public and privatized 
counties” (Bouche and Volden, 2011; p.439). 
All of the aforementioned studies contribute to the literature in various ways. 
Section 2 outlines the model and variables in the model.   
2.2 Model of Local Government Outsourcing and Variable Selection 
 
Following the lead of Berry and Berry’s (1990) influential study of lottery 
adoptions, I incorporate both internal determinants (i.e. political, economic, and social 
characteristics motivate policy adoption) and diffusion (i.e. policy adoption decisions are 
influenced by similar jurisdictions) to form a unified model to perform the analysis. Berry 
and Berry (1990) argue the estimations are more reliable this way. The next section 
specifies model details. 
2.2.1 A Spatial-Autoregressive Model with Spatial-Autoregressive Disturbances  
 
The dependent variable is the proportion of services provided by contracting out 
with for-profit firms or non-profit organizations. The response is obtained from 
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International City and County Management (ICMA)’s Alternative Service Delivery 
(ASD) survey data. ICMA conducts ASD survey asking cities and counties about how 67 
services are delivered: provided in house or contracted with private for-profit firms or 
non-profit organizations if they provide the service. Although Fernandez, Ryu and 
Brudney (2008) developed their dependent variable by counting the number of services 
provided through privatization using the same dataset, my method takes into 
consideration that not all cities or counties provide all services, thus capturing a more 
accurate picture.  
Given the unified model measures spatial interdependencies among local 
governments, ordinary least square (OLS) model does not fit the task for the following 
reason.  
A standard OLS model can be written as: 
                                                                (1) 
One of the standard assumptions of OLS is that the error term  is uncorrelated 
across observations. In addition, as we know, all unobserved and/or measured variables 
are categorized into error terms. However, a basic spatial insight is that “everything is 
related to everything else, but closer things are more closely related”5 (Waldo Tobler’s 
First Law of Geography, 1970). As such, “errors”  in the current observation are 
correlated to the “errors”  in other units, which is contradictory to the assumption made 
by OLS. (Beck and Beardsley, 2006) 
Fortunately, the solution for that is readily available. Building off of Cliff-Ord’s 
spatial-autoregressive (SAR) model, introducing a right-hand-side variable as a spatial 
                                               
5 This assumption will be tested later in the paper. 
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lag to address spatial spillovers in the dependent variable, a spatial autoregressive model 
with autoregressive disturbances is developed to address the concern raised above 
(Kelejian and Prucha, 1998; Drukker, Prucha, and Raciborski, 2011). The model allows 
“for spatial interactions in the dependent variable, the exogenous variables, and the 
disturbances” (Drukker, Prucha, and Raciborski, 2011, p.3): 
                                                     (2) 
                                                                                          (3) 
Where 
priva_pro is the dependent variable, proportion of services privatized (an  
vector); 
W and M are  inverse distance spatial-weighting matrices (with zero 
diagonal elements); 
Wpriva_pro and Mu are  vectors typically referred to as spatial lags, and  
and  are the corresponding scalar parameters referred to as spatial-
autoregressive parameters; 
X is an  matrix of observations on k right-hand-side exogenous variables 
(where some of the variables may be spatial lags of exogenous variables), and  
is the corresponding  parameter vector. X will be specified in next section; 
is an error term.  
In sum, the model specified above is suitable for estimating the spatial dependency 
with the dependent variable of proportion of services privatized. The next section 
introduces variables used for the analysis. 
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2.2.2 Variable Selection 
 
I begin by specifying the connectivity matrix chosen for the spatial autoregressive 
model. A connectivity matrix “specifies the degree of interdependence between any two 
observations” (Beck, 2006; p.28). There are normally two connectivity measures 
geographically: a binary measure of contiguity (i.e. two units are next to each other or 
closer than a certain distance) and a continuous measure of distance between two units. 
Although it is optimal to have both measures included in the model (Bouche and Volden, 
2011), based on the low response rate for ICMA’s ASD survey (i.e. 26.2% for the 2007 
ASD survey, 23.9% for the 2002-2003 ASD survey, and 32% for 1997 the ASD survey), 
the only option I have is to include a continuous measure of distance between two units, 
more specifically, an inverse distance weighting matrix.  
An inverse-distance matrix is calculated as follows. Denote the matrix W, with  
a typical element in W.  where D(i,j) is the distance between places i and j. 
In practice, W is often normalized for analysis. In this case, W is going to be normalized 
by row, which means each element in row i is divided by the sum of row i’s elements. 
(Beck, 2006; Kelejian and Prucha, 1998; Drukker, Prucha, and Raciborski, 2011) 
Other explanatory and control variables include political actors and institutions, 
socio-economic characteristics, and demographic variables. Following the lead of 
Fernandez, Ryu, and Brudney’s (2008) study, various variables will be included in the 
model, such as “citizens’ preference for the size and role of government; the political 
ideology and partisanship of citizens and elected officials; and public employee and 
union strength at the local level” (Fernandez, Ryu, and Brudney, 2008; p. 442). 
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It is a common belief that citizens’ preference could shape and affect policy 
makers’ decisions. It is especially so at a city level because of “physical proximity among 
citizens and elected officials compared to other levels of government” (Fernandez, Ryu 
and Brudney, 2008; p.442). As such, I expect local citizens opposition to privatization 
(citizen opposition) and local elected officials opposition to privatization (official 
opposition) are all negatively correlated with privatization practices. Additionally, as 
strong desire for small and efficient government became widespread among the U.S. 
localities, citizens’ desire of a decreased role for government (small government) should 
have a positive impact on local outsourcing. 
A city manager with professional training background is more likely to understand 
how to compose a comprehensive contract for outsourcing and how to appropriately 
manage and monitor the contract. Thus a city manager is more likely to rely on 
outsourcing as a means to deliver services (council-administrator/manager). Speaking of 
managerial strength of a city manager, Fernandez et al. (2008) listed a neat set of 
managerial factors, which will be incorporated in this paper. Those are:  
1) ex ante analysis and planning efforts (ex ante management), which is a factor 
score created from dichotomous ICMA survey indicators of whether the local 
government identified successful privatization initiatives in other 
jurisdictions, established a citizens’ advisory committee on privatization, and 
hired consultants to study the feasibility of privatization. 2) Monitoring 
capacity (monitoring capacity) is a factor score created from dichotomous 
ICMA survey indicators of whether the local government evaluated citizen 
satisfaction, cost, and compliance with standards of private service delivery, 
and whether it employed citizen surveys, monitoring of citizen complaints, 
field observations, and analysis of data and records to evaluate private 
service delivery. 3) External stakeholder involvement (external involvement) 
is an index score (0-6) created from dichotomous ICMA survey indicators of 
whether the following external stakeholders were involved in studying the 
feasibility of privatization: potential service providers; professional 
consultants; service recipients/customers; managers in other local 
governments; citizen advisory committees; and state agencies, leagues, and 
associations. And 4) measuring efforts to reduce legal barriers to 
privatization at the local level (reduce legal barriers), a factor score created 
36 
 
from dichotomous ICMA survey indicators of whether the local government 
recommended changes in state and local law to ensure success in 
implementing privatization. (Fernandez, Ryu, and Brudney, 2008; p. 446) 
 
All four managerial factors should be positively correlated with the dependent 
variable. Public employees and unions play a critical role in the use of privatization.  In 
this regard, public officials’ opposition and public employees’ opposition to the use of 
outsourcing should have negative impacts on local privatization. (Fernandez, Ryu, and 
Brudney, 2008) However, due to data availability, union variable at local level is not 
included in the analysis. 
Many scholars in privatization research give attention to fiscal stress and 
competition among providers (Dilger, et al. 1997; Brown and Potoski, 2003; Morgan, and 
England, 1998; Greene, 2002; Boyne, 1998; Fernandez et al., 2008). Therefore, the 
following variables are included in the model as proxies for how well a local government 
is doing: short term debt, long term debt, and a factor score created from three 
dichotomous ICMA survey indicators of perceived fiscal stress (perceived fiscal stress). 
A dichotomous ICMA survey indicator of insufficient supply of competent private 
providers (insufficient providers) is included in the model for competition measure. 
Again, the last three variables are borrowed from Fernandez el al. (2008).  
In addition, full time pay per employee is believed to have a negative impact on the 
use of outsourcing based on two reasons. First, the higher pay means a municipality 
would be able to recruit higher skilled workers, who are more capable to provide services 
in-house. Second, city employees that enjoy higher pay may want to retain their benefits 
by opposing to the use of outsourcing. However, one plausible counter argument is that if 
a jurisdiction with higher paid workers do not behave any better than other jurisdictions, 
higher full time pay may actually trigger public officials to consider the use of 
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outsourcing in order to provide services more efficiently. Considering I do not have the 
performance measure at this point, I argue full time pay per employee is negatively 
correlated with the use of outsourcing.  
Total tax revenue and direct expenditure are included as a proxy for the size of 
public employee labor force since the total number of employees are subjected to 
endogenous issue (i.e. outsourcing is used as a means to reduce city labor force by some 
local jurisdictions). Local population and metro status are included as control variables.  
2.2.3 Data 
 
Table 2.1: Independent and Control Variables 
Variable Sources of data 
Expected 
Impact 
Full time pay per employee U.S. Census Bureau - 
External Involvement ICMA + 
Citizen opposition ICMA - 
Official opposition ICMA - 
Small government ICMA + 
Reduce legal barriers ICMA + 
Employee opposition ICMA - 
Ex ante evaluation ICMA + 
Monitoring capacity ICMA + 
Insufficient Providers ICMA - 
Taxes U.S. Census Bureau  
Direct Expenditure U.S. Census Bureau  
Short term debt U.S. Census Bureau + 
Long term debt-Private Purpose U.S. Census Bureau + 
Long term debt-Public Purpose U.S. Census Bureau + 
Perceived fiscal stress ICMA + 
Population U.S. Census Bureau  
Metro Status ICMA  
Form of Government ICMA  
Region ICMA  
 
The privatization data are purchased from the International City/County 
Management Association  (ICMA). The survey covers service delivery choices for the 
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following areas: public works/transportation, public utilities, public safety, health and 
human services, parks and recreational activities, cultural arts, and support services. The 
survey data obtained are for the year 2007. In addition, ICMA data is augmented with 
city and county financial and demographic data that are obtained from the Census to form 
the final dataset. Table 2.1 shows sources of independent variable, level of analysis, and 
expected sign associated with each variable. 
Total tax revenue, debt, and expenditures are all measured in millions of dollars. 
Geographic region and Metro Status are categorical variables. Geographic region has four 
categories: 1=Northeast (New England and Mid-Atlantic), 2=North Central (East North-
Central and West North-Central), 3=South (South Atlantic, East South-Central and West 
North-Central), and 4=West (Mountain and Pacific Coast). Metro status has three 
categories: (1) central cities, (2) suburban, and (3) independent cities. Summary statistics 
are shown in Table 2.2.  
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Proportion of services privatized 1041 0.315 0.196 0.020 0.935 
Full time pay per employee 
($1000) 1041 40.239 1.012 1.428 7.968 
External involvement 1041 0.671 0.992 0 6 
Citizen opposition 1041 0.125 0.331 0 1 
Officials opposition 1041 0.159 0.366 0 1 
Demand small government 1041 0.069 0.254 0 1 
Legal restriction 1041 0.183 0.386 0 1 
Employee opposition 1041 0.191 0.393 0 1 
Ex ante evaluation  1041 0.279 0.449 0 1 
Monitoring capacity 1041 0.476 0.500 0 1 
Insufficient provider 1041 0.122 0.327 0 1 
Tax 1041 0.153 0.313 <0.001 5.192 
Direct expenditure 1041 0.363 0.772 0.001 13.4 
Short term debt 1041 0.007 0.026 0 0.202 
Long term debt-private purposes  1041 0.076 0.432 0 8.178 
Long term debt-public purposes  1041 0.407 1.186 0 16.2 
Perceived fiscal stress 1041 0.455 0.498 0 1 
Region indicator 1041 2.546 1.022 1 4 
Form of government indicator 1041 1.867 0.686 1 7 
Metro Status 1041 2.090 0.609 1 3 
Population 1041 45857 96351 2522 1552259 
Population category indicator 1041 5.616 1.418 0 8 
Population Square (1,000,000 
squared) 1041 0.001 0.010 <0.001 2.41 
Note: Tax, debt, revenue and expenditure are in millions.  
 
This section outlines the model and variables used for the analysis. Section 3 
presents the empirical test results and offers some discussions. It is worth noting that 
although the response rate for the 2007 ICMA survey was 26.2%, the sample was 
representative in terms of size of population, geographic region, and metropolitan status. 
The only exception is that Northeast region is a bit under represented (i.e. 19.8% local 
jurisdictions responded to the survey in this region); whereas West region is somewhat 
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overrepresented (i.e. 33.4% local jurisdictions responded to the survey in this region). As 
such, the results should be generalizable to nonrespondents with some caution.  
2.3 Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
Due to the nature of a spatial study, Alaska and Hawaii are excluded from the 
study. A dataset of 1041 observations is formed after merging the ICMA ASD 2007 
dataset with the US Census Bureau’s database on individual local government 
employment (“IndEmp”) and local government finances (“IndFin”).  
The number of services provided by the 1041 jurisdictions that are in the dataset 
ranges from 6 to 67, with an average of 43 services provided to their citizens. Among 
those services, on average, 32% are provided through privatization. The percentage of 
services privatized goes down as low as 2%, and goes up as high as 93%. Although the 
level of analysis for the study is at municipal level, considering the relatively low 
response rate of ICMA ASD survey, I aggregate the average percentage of service 
privatized to state level to see if there is any pattern geographically across the US (for 
illustration purposes only).  
The darker shade represents, on average, higher percentages of services delivered 
through outsourcing. As we can see from the map, the pattern is obvious. There are two 
blocks on the map utilizing privatizations more than others. One block is the states on the 
west coast; another block is the states of Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Kentucky, and 
Illinois. It is also obvious that the states located in the central U.S. use outsourcing the 
least. It is clear that states that have lower percentage of their services outsourced also 
stick together.  
 
41 
 
Figure 2.1: Average Percentage of Services Privatized by Municipalities in a State: 
2007 
 
Before running the analysis, one problem emerged. A percentage dependent 
variable that is bounded between 0 and 1 could be problematic in the regression analysis. 
In addition, Kernel density curve reveals that the dependent variable is not normally 
distributed (Figure 2.2).  
When such problem presents, it is customary to take a logit transformation to map 
the dependent variable from 0 to 1 to a real line. Moreover, after the transformation, the 
kernel density curve shows the dependent variable is approximately normally distributed 
(Figure 2.3). Therefore, the logit transformation of the dependent variable is used as 
dependent variable in the regression. 
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Figure 2.2: Kernel Density Curve of Percentage of Service Privatized 
 
 
In order to verify the validity to use spatial-autoregressive model, spatial 
autocorrelation of the dependent variable needs to be tested. Both Moran’s I and Geary’s 
C are widely used in the literature to test for spatial autocorrelation. Based on the dataset 
we have, a 1041X1041 normalized row inverse distance matrix (W) is created. Using 
dependent variable “proportion of services privatized” and W, Moran’s I and Geary’s C 
are calculated as shown below. 
 
 
  
43 
 
Figure 2.3: Kernel Density Curve of Logit Transformation of Percentage of Service 
Privatized 
 
Both Moran’s I and Geary’s C test statistics are statistically significant at the 1% 
level, which indicates that autocorrelation is significant at the 1% level. The value of 
Moran’s I lies between -1 and 1. A positive test statistic means positive autocorrelation 
while a negative value means negative autocorrelation. Geary’s C’s value ranges from 0 
(indicating perfect dispersion) to 2 (perfect correlation). Both Moran’s I and Geary’s C 
suggest the proportions of services privatized are positively auto correlated. 
Those two tests verify the validity of using a spatial-autoregressive model with 
spatial-autoregressive disturbances. Empirical results are presented in Table 2.4. The first 
model is analyzed without state fixed effects, which serves as a basic model. The second 
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model incorporates state fixed effects to see if state fixed effects could have any 
additional power to explain the use of outsourcing. 
Table 2.3: Moran’s I and Geary’s C Test 
 Proportion 
privatized 
Z p-value 
Moran’s I 0.039 9.208 <0.001 
Geary’s C 0.966 -5.629 <0.001 
The first two columns show results from the first model. External involvement, as 
defined earlier, is an index score that sums up who outside a local government 
organization is involved in evaluating the feasibility of private service delivery. The 
results suggest the more external actors involved, the more a local jurisdiction outsources 
its service. This is consistent with our hypothesis because a higher score also indicates 
that local officials actively seek out alternatives. The measure of scarcity of service 
providers (insufficient provider) is negatively correlated with the percentage of services 
outsourced. The impact is as expected since privatization would not be a good candidate 
if the private market is not competitive. By comparison, more services will be outsourced 
if a local government enhances its monitoring capacity. In addition, the level of a local 
jurisdiction’s long term debt is positively correlated with the percentage of services 
outsourced. On average, $1 million debt contributes to 12.7% more services privatized.  
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Table 2.4: Estimated Effect of Explanatory Variables on Percentage of Service 
Outsourced (log transformation) 
 Log Transformation of 
Percentage of Service 
Outsourced 
Log Transformation of 
Percentage of Service 
Outsourced with State f.e. 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Full time pay per capita ($1,000) -0.015 0.035 0.017 0.041 
External involvement 0.082** 0.040 0.104*** 0.040 
Citizen opposition -0.172 0.121 -0.171 0.123 
Officials opposition 0.046 0.112 0.005 0.113 
Demand small government -0.076 0.136 -0.048 0.139 
Legal restriction -0.037 0.096 -0.056 0.099 
Employee opposition 0.019 0.104 -0.006 0.106 
Ex ante evaluation  -0.011 0.088 -0.024 0.088 
Monitoring capacity 0.139* 0.075 0.124* 0.075 
Insufficient provider -0.296*** 0.104 -0.262** 0.108 
Tax 0.150 0.371 -0.183 0.515 
Direct expenditure -0.291 0.202 -0.253 0.229 
Short term debt 0.314 1.320 2.420 1.620 
Long term debt-private purposes 0.127* 0.076 0.116 0.077 
Long term debt-public purposes 
($Millions) 
0.054 0.065 0.061 0.074 
Perceived Fiscal Stress -0.087 0.179 0.006 0.182 
Metro status_2_Suburban 0.235** 0.111 0.244** 0.113 
Metro status_3_Independent 0.008 0.128 0.109 0.134 
Form of gov. Council-manager 0.045 0.075 -0.027 0.086 
Form of gov. Commission 0.180 0.287 -0.178 0.331 
Form of gov. Town meeting 0.215 0.166 0.237 0.270 
Form of gov. Representative 
town meeting 
-0.502 0.342 -0.502 0.439 
North Central Region -0.120* 0.063 NA NA 
South Region -0.107 0.080 NA NA 
West Region -0.222*** 0.077 NA NA 
Population -0.095 0.847 0.550 0.900 
lambda (spatial-autoregressive 
parameter for Wpriva_pro) 
1.885*** 0.171 2.043*** 0.197 
rho (spatial-autoregressive 
parameter for Mu) 
-2.106*** 0.391 -2.662*** 0.410 
Geographic region has four categories: Northeast, North Central, South, and West.  
Northeast region is the base group. The results suggest that South region does not behave 
statistically differently from the Northeast region in terms of privatization activities. 
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North Central region and West region tend to privatize less when comparing to Northeast 
region.  Metro status has three categories: (1) central cities, (2) suburban, and (3) 
independent cities. There is no statistical difference between central cities and 
independent cities, but suburban cities are more likely to privatize. On average, a 
suburban city outsources 23.5% more of its services than a central city. This result 
verifies our argument that suburban cities are more likely to adopt privatization as a 
means to deliver their services. A positive and statistically significant lambda in the direct 
reaction function indicates that a local government’s sourcing decision is influenced by 
its nearby neighbors.  
The results from the second model remain similar to the first model. Since the state 
fixed effects are introduced in the analysis, the region categorical variables are no longer 
needed in the analysis. The coefficients and standard errors on other independent 
variables change slightly. The only difference, when controlled for state fixed effects, is 
that the debt level does not show any statistical significance.  
2.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter brings privatization studies and a spatial model together to explore 
factors that contribute to local jurisdictions’ sourcing decisions. A spatial-autoregressive 
model is used to test the hypothesis. Moran’s I and Geary’s C tests verify the 
autocorrelation of privatization activities. This study examines privatization practices at 
the local level comprehensively. The dataset contains more than 1000 municipalities.  
This study incorporates spatial econometric techniques to assess how privatization 
practices are affected by various factors. Both of these are rarely seen in privatization 
literature. 
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The results suggest the form and location of local governments matter when it 
comes to privatization. More specifically, North Central and South regions tend to 
privatize less compared to the Northeast region. Suburban cities rely more on outsourcing 
than central cities. In addition, external stakeholders’ involvement and monitoring 
capacity exert positive pressure on the use of outsourcing whereas a limited supply of 
private vendors impedes it. Some policy implications can be derived from the results 
shown above. 
First of all, a positive spatial-autoregressive parameter in the direct reaction 
function indicates that learning from other nearby local jurisdictions is important for 
public officials who consider the use of outsourcing. Such practice not only help local 
officials to identify dos and don’ts prior to outsourcing a service, but also provide 
potential opportunities for inter municipal cooperation. Second, getting more external 
stakeholders on board also helps to facilitate the use of outsourcing. At the same time, 
enhanced monitoring capacity helps ensure the quality of the service outsourced, which 
in turn boosts the use of privatization. Last but not least, when the potential market for 
contracting out services is not competitive, it is helpful for local officials to broaden their 
view. One possibility is to contact nearby local jurisdictions to see if inter municipal 
cooperation is feasible. Another possible solution to the problem is to look beyond the 
local market. It is possible that national market might be thick and robust when potential 
service provider is lacking at local level.  
 
Copyright © Zhiwei Zhang 2013  
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Chapter 3. Produce or Buy? -- An Analysis of Government Procurement from 
Transaction Cost and Revenue Volatility Perspective 
Governments traditionally provided all kinds of goods and services in-house; 
however, as more citizens demanded more civil services and more efficiency, 
governments began to think about how to deliver those services in an effective manner 
(Brown and Potoski, 2003). More recently, the demand for “do more with less” is more 
urgent than ever before as the recession eroded cities’ financial stability and widened 
budget shortfalls and deficits. In the worst case, cities have had to file for bankruptcy or 
declare financial emergency6
Privatization came to surface as a perfect solution for deficit-plagued governments 
as it is thought to be more cost effective and outperform the public sector in most cases. 
Municipalities turn to private provision to deliver public services as a means to reduce 
cost and cushion the financial uncertainty. One extreme example is that public officials of 
Maywood, California have announced that the city had fully outsourced on July 1st, 2009, 
becoming the first city to do so in the country
 to cope with the situation.   
7
                                               
6 Deficits Push N.Y. Cities and Counties to Desperation. Available at: 
.  However, the city lost its contractor as a 
pay and pension scandal erupted. Although this case is a bit extreme, the use of 
outsourcing has become widespread all across the U.S. As such, it is essential to 
understand how to properly specify the conditions under which it is optimal to buy and 
under which it is optimal to produce in-house, so that when a city decides to outsource, it 
can claim the benefits (cost saving, improved performance) and avoid hazardous 
outcomes (pay dispute, corruption, pension scandal). I apply a transaction cost economics 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/nyregion/deficits-push-municipalities-to-
desperation.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
7 The Pros and Cons of Privatizing Government Functions. Available at: 
http://www.governing.com/topics/mgmt/pros-cons-privatizing-government-functions.html 
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(TCE) framework complemented with revenue volatility measure to analyze contracting 
decisions.  
The article is divided into five sections. The first section outlines the original TCE 
argument and revenue volatility.  Section 2 presents theoretical considerations and a brief 
literature review. Section 3 details model, method and variable selections. Empirical 
results are shown in section 4. The conclusion follows. 
3.1 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and Revenue Volatility 
 
Because transactions differ in their attributes and governance structures, transaction 
cost economics aims to determine in which way transactions can be aligned in a 
transaction-cost-economizing way, which means minimizing the cost for each transaction 
(Williamson, 1981). This is complemented by assessments of revenue volatility in order 
to draw efficient boundaries between firms and markets. The concept of efficient 
boundary here refers to either a firm making a component itself or buying it from an 
autonomous supplier. Also TCE treats the transaction as the basic unit of analysis 
(Williamson, 1981). In this manner, TCE can be a crucial analytical tool in deciding 
whether governments should “produce or buy”.   
In order to better understand TCE, assumptions about human actors, the 
dimensions of transaction, and governance structures are now introduced. 
3.1.1 Human Actors 
 
In contrast to neoclassical theory, people in TCE are subjected to bounded 
rationality and opportunism. To put it differently, bounded rational actors (either 
principals or agents) are believed to possess limited analytical and data processing 
abilities, thus experiencing difficulties in formulating and solving complex problems and 
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in processing (receiving, storing, retrieving, transmitting) information. TCE also 
recognizes that at least some agents are opportunists who seek self-interest with guile (i.e. 
disguise attributes or preferences, distort data, obfuscate issues). As such, “incomplete 
contracting is the best that can be achieved” due to the inability to account for possessed 
information, future events and opportunism behaviors (Williamson, 1981). 
3.1.2 Governance 
 
Commons (1932) expresses the idea that a transaction “must include in itself the 
three principles of conflict, mutuality, and order”. By following this idea, Williamson 
(2002) defines governance as “the means by which to infuse order, thereby to mitigate 
conflict and to realize ‘the most fundamental of all understandings in economics,’ mutual 
gain from voluntary exchange.” In this manner, governance structures could fit into a 
spectrum. Simple transactions (i.e. office supplies) lie at one end, which represents a 
pure, anonymous spot market. Markets are thick and competitive at this end. An example 
would be purchasing office supplies, let us say a printer. Although a buyer may not have 
the necessary information to know how much it costs to manufacture a printer, because 
there are multiple vendors (thick market) selling printers, and the market is competitive, 
she could easily obtain a retail price that ensures she is not overpaying for the product.  
By comparison, another end is the fully integrated firm that owns all parts of the 
supply chain and production process. Again, let us assume printers with very 
sophisticated technologies that are used in some extreme places (i.e. printers that work in 
space or Arctic). Under this scenario, the retail price may be way over the production cost 
due to information asymmetry and non-competitive market. Therefore, the best way to 
obtain the cost and reasonable retail price is to own the manufacturer and supply 
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channels. Between the two extremes are “hybrid” modes (i.e. complex contracts and 
partial ownership arrangements) (Shelanski and Klein, 1995). 
3.1.3 Dimensions of Transaction 
 
As the name of TCE suggests, the transaction is critical to TCE analysis. Thus how 
to better understand transactions is crucial for the analysis. Williamson defines three 
dimensions of transactions: (1) uncertainty, (2) the frequency with which transactions 
recur, and (3) asset specificity. Among the three, Williamson (1981) claims asset 
specificity is the most important dimension for describing transactions. Asset specificity 
can be described as: 
Site specificity, as when successive stations are located in cheek-by-jowl relation 
to each other so as to economize on inventory and transportation expenses; 
physical asset specificity, as where specialized dies are required to produce a 
component; and human asset specificity that arises from learning by doing 
(p.555, Williamson, 1981). 
 
When assets are nonspecific, markets are thick and competitive, thus there are 
lower transaction costs and governance cost through buying rather than making. In 
addition, markets could combine uncorrelated demand and take advantage of scale 
economies. Classical market operations are preferred in this scenario. The printer 
example mentioned above also fits here. However, the advantages for using classical 
market reduce when assets are semi-specific. For example, when site specificity is needed 
(i.e. buyer requires manufacturer nearby), the mobility for a purchaser to buy is confined. 
As such, transaction costs rise because “exchange takes on a progressively stronger 
bilateral character” (Williamson, 1981). Unified ownership (internal production) is the 
best way to go when assets are highly specific.  
In addition, uncertainty is another key factor in terms of TCE analysis. Bajari and 
Tadelis (2001) use a perfect example to illustrate uncertainty, which is the building of the 
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Getty Center Art Museum in Los Angeles. The museum cost $1 billion and took over 8 
years to construct. (See Engineering News0Record, 1994 and 1997) 
The project design had to be changed due to site conditions that were hard to 
anticipate. The geology of the project included canyons, slide planes, and 
earthquake fault lines, which posed numerous challenges for the team of 
architects and contractors. For instance, contractors “hit a slide” and 
unexpectedly moved 75,000 cubic yards of earth. More severely, in 1994 an 
earthquake struck. Cracks in the steel welds of the building’s frame caused the 
contractors to reassess the adequacy of the seismic design standards that were 
used. The project design also had to be altered due to the regulatory environment 
– 107 items had to be added to the building’s conditional use permit. (p.388, 
Bajari and Tadelis, 2001) 
 
As we can see, such problems are extremely hard to anticipate. TCE expects 
transaction cost increases as uncertainty rises. High uncertainty will for sure increase 
transaction costs, such as high cost for writing a comprehensive contract or renegotiation 
cost due to the rise of unexpected issues. However, “TCE does not predict that 
uncertainty would itself lead to hierarchical governance.” It is contingent on asset 
specificity. If future demand is unclear but assets are nonspecific, the future markets 
might be competitive and there will likely be many potential suppliers for a component; 
thus it is cheaper to buy than produce in-house. Otherwise, making internally will be 
preferable to buying (Shelanski and Klein, 1995).  
All in all, TCE was originally developed to address issues mainly in the context of 
commercial organizations; however, as Williamson put it, so long as any issue can be 
framed as a contracting problem, directly or indirectly, the issue can be analyzed in 
transaction-cost-economizing terms (Williamson, 1981).  And now, TCE has shown up in 
various arenas, such as vertical and lateral integration, transfer pricing, corporate finance, 
marketing, the organization of work, long-term commercial contracting, franchising, 
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regulation, the multinational corporation, company towns, and other contractual 
relationships, both formal and informal (Shelanski and Klein, 1995).  
Although TCE is a key aspect of determining the produce-or-buy decision for 
government procurement, it is not sufficient. There are several reasons for that; first of 
all, TCE aims to bring efficiency into transactions. However, efficiency is not the sole 
focus for government; it is not even a major focus sometimes. Additionally, fiscal stress 
is widely regarded as the leading cause for out sourcing in the U.S. local governments 
(Dilger, et al. 1997; Brown and Potoski, 2003; Morgan, and England, 1988). Despite how 
efficient and/or how cost-effective the contract is, governments need to come up with the 
revenue to cover the cost.  
Here I incorporate a financial well-being measure, revenue volatility, to serve as a 
key determinant for local governments outsourcing.  
3.1.4 Revenue Volatility  
 
Revenue volatility, similar to the financial risk in corporate business, indicates that 
the market return or profit is fluctuating and hard to predict over time (Yan and Wang, 
2010). Revenue volatility measures to what extent the actual revenue differs from the 
expected revenue (White, 1983). A stable revenue stream helps governments maintain 
effective operation; whereas volatile revenue “can affect the continuity of public service 
delivery and cause other long run inefficiencies” (Yan and Wang, 2010; p.3).  
Regardless the importance of the TCE framework and revenue volatility for 
explaining local governments’ privatization decisions, there are other factors that need to 
be taken into consideration. In the private sector, consumers normally do not care who 
produces/delivers the goods/services as long as they get what they want. This is not the 
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case when conducting procurement for governments. Citizens sometimes want their 
governments to deliver the services and they have expectations about how they will be 
decided and delivered (i.e. citizens involvement and anti-discrimination policies). Details 
about theoretical considerations and variables selections are specified in the following 
section.  
3.2 Theoretical Considerations and Variable Selection 
 
Propositions presented in this section are synthesized based on the TCE 
framework, revenue volatility and procurement literature. I begin with specifying 
theoretical links between TCE and procurement decisions. I then argue about how 
volatile revenue could affect outsourcing at the municipal level.  
3.2.1 Contract Management Difficulty  
 
A high level of uncertainty increases the contract management difficulty and 
increases the possibility of renegotiating contract terms when unexpected issues occur. 
Thus, in-house production is preferred. Moreover, if in-house production is not feasible, 
cost-plus contracts are better than fixed price contracts because, as mentioned above, 
higher levels of uncertainty associate with higher costs of writing comprehensive 
contracts, and a fixed price contract has no ability to take all unexpected issues into 
consideration. Renegotiating for the contract terms will for sure boost the transaction 
cost. In comparison, cost plus contracts could save on transaction cost by setting up 
contingency terms. The aforementioned example of the Getty Center Art Museum in Los 
Angeles is a good fit here to illustrate why in-house production or cost-plus contract is 
superior to other options. 
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Walker and Weber (1984) use volume uncertainty and technological uncertainty to 
examine produce-or-buy decisions from a TCE prospective. They gather the data (a list of 
automobile components) from a division of a U.S. automobile company to perform the 
analysis. Authors have shown that volume uncertainty and supplier market competition 
have a positive, albeit small, effect to produce a component. Technological uncertainty 
(frequency of changes in product specification and the probability of technological 
improvements), however, failed to show the effect.  
Based on studies in consumer satisfaction and the supply channels literature, Klein, 
Frazier and Roth (1990) add a TCE perspective to test the level of channel integration in 
foreign markets. The authors interviewed 375 Canadian exporters. In the analysis, they 
used asset specificity and environmental uncertainty as endogenous variables. They 
conclude asset specificity is positively related to the level of channel integration, but 
there is no consistent support for environmental uncertainty to be positively correlated 
with the level of channel integration. Later on, a similar study performed by Klein and 
Roth (1993) focused on determinants of channel satisfaction. Environmental uncertainty 
and ability to monitor channels are used as explanatory variables, whereas level of firm’s 
satisfaction with existing channels is used as the explained variable. They find that both 
lower levels of uncertainty and higher ability to monitor channels provide significant 
explanations for management satisfaction.  
Moreover, Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) reviewed a considerable amount of 
marketing literature in transaction cost analysis. The authors summarize that only a few 
TCE researchers confirm the positive relationship between environmental uncertainty and 
vertical integration; the dominant view among TCE researchers is “environmental 
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uncertainty either has no impact on vertical integration or acts as a disincentive against 
integration” (p.45). In short, both technical and environmental uncertainties fail to show 
statistical significance toward make or buy decisions in the reviewed literature.  
3.2.2 Asset Specificity and Service/Goods Measurability 
 
Williamson (p.566, 1981) proposes a two-by-two table to illustrate the relationship 
between human asset specificity (high and low) and measurability (easy and hard). Four 
quadrants represent four different combinations between the two. I borrow the idea and 
set up a similar two-by-two table to show the combination effects between asset 
specificity and measurability that government procurers commonly face (as shown in 
Figure 3.1).  
Figure 3.1: Asset Specificity and Service/Goods Measurability 
 
  Asset Specificity 
  Nonspecific (H1) Specific (H2) 
Measurability 
Easy (M1) Buy 
Buy w/ bilateral 
dependency 
Difficult (M2) 
Buy w/ competitive market 
Produce w/ thin market 
Produce through  
Joint contacting 
 
H1, M1: Solid waste collection would fit into such situation. Because, first, the outcome 
is easy to measure (i.e. clean neighborhoods) and second, no specific skills are required 
performing the task. Under this context, the autonomous spot market provides efficacious 
solution for government procurement.  
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• PROPOSITION (H1, M1): When assets are non-specific and services/goods are easy 
to measure, ceteris paribus, government should buy externally.  
H1, M2: Under this context, competitive markets reduce opportunistic behaviors and 
correct the situation of information asymmetry, thus buying is a preferred choice. In 
comparison, non-competitive markets help goods/services providers hide information 
from procurers, which may lead to procurers overpaying for the goods/services. For 
instance, a local government wants to reduce illiteracy rates by offering some courses to 
the public. The illiteracy rates, however, will not drop immediately after one or two 
courses are offered. It requires a relatively long period of time to see the result produced 
by the courses. As such, if the local government outsources the service, the contractor 
enjoys certain information advantages over the local government. If the market is not 
competitive, the contracting agency may not feel the urgency to lower the cost or to 
provide good lectures. 
• PROPOSITION (H1, M2): When assets are non-specific and services/goods are 
difficult to measure, ceteris paribus, government should buy externally if markets 
are competitive; otherwise, government should produce in-house. 
H2, M1: One example to show such scenario is outsourcing water services and 
wastewater treatment, both of which require a significant upfront investment and specific 
skills to perform the job. The outcome is relatively easy to measure. Under this context, a 
contractor who wins the first round auction enjoys the natural advantage in the following 
bidding circles because of asset specificity and the initial investment they have made. 
Thus first round bidding needs some extra efforts to write comprehensive contract and 
screen bidders.  
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• PROPOSITION (H2, M1): When assets are specific and services/goods are easy to 
measure, ceteris paribus, government should procure externally but paying extra 
attention on the first round. 
H2, M2: One situation that fits for such context would be space exploration and 
transportation. It is obvious that we need highly specific trained personnel to do the job 
and outcome is extremely hard to measure. Because of that, the private sector would 
never be able to fully manage a program like that. Under this context, government should 
produce such services/goods in-house because of enormous self-interest seeking 
opportunities for opportunists. If producing is not feasible because the start-up cost (i.e. 
the investment for specific asset) is too high or subjected to technology limitations, 
government should rely on non-profit driven agencies (i.e. neighboring governments, 
non-profit organizations). 
• PROPOSITION (H2, M2): When assets are specific and services/goods are difficult 
to measure, ceteris paribus, government should produce in-house or joint 
contracting with neighboring governments/non-profit agencies. 
3.2.3 Asset Specificity 
 
TCE predicts that high level of asset specificity increases transaction costs due to 
the bilateral dependency and idiosyncratic investment. Empirically, Klein, Frazier and 
Roth (1990) claim asset specificity is positively related to the level of channel integration. 
In addition, Walker and Poppo (1991) designed a questionnaire to survey a large U.S. 
manufacturer about its supply relationships. Their aim is to address relationship between 
asset specificity and comparative transaction costs. The results support that specialized 
assets have lower transaction costs within the organization.  
59 
 
Similarly, Pilling, Crosby and Jackson (1994) found asset specificity is positively 
correlated with both ex ante and ex post costs whereas Sriram, Krapfel and Spekman 
(1992) confirmed that supplier-specific investments are negatively related to perceived 
buyer dependence. As such, most empirical studies that address asset specificity and 
transaction produce results consistent with TCE. 
So far, TCE has shed useful light on determining mechanisms used for 
procurement theoretically. In the meantime, how reliable the revenue stream is should 
certainly have some impacts on the way in which governments choose service delivery 
arrangements.  
3.2.4 Revenue Volatility  
 
As mentioned above, revenue volatility is used as a proxy for local governments’ 
financial well-being measure. Although the theoretical link between revenue volatility 
and government procurement is not an obvious one, we can get some hints from the 
revenue volatility literature.   
Revenue volatility is mainly assessed in the literature as a proxy for policy 
volatility (Afonso, 2010; Afonso, 2012; Ebeke, 2012; Riscado, 2011). Scholars 
investigate the relationship between political institutions and policy volatility, more 
specifically, scholars interested in finding out what does policy volatility mean to 
economic growth. A large body of empirical work exists at the national level. The 
literature has consistently found that policy volatility impedes economic growth. By 
using cross-country panel datasets, Aizenman and Marion (1993), Ramey and Ramey 
(1994), Bleaney (1996), Brunetti (1997) and Fatas and Mihov (2006) all found a strong 
negative correlation between policy uncertainty or volatility and economic growth.  
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It is obvious that the revenue volatility literature mentioned above does not link 
directly to my research. But nothing stops me from borrowing the idea in the literature: 
instead of using revenue volatility as a proxy for policy volatility or political institutions, 
I use revenue volatility as a proxy for local governments’ financial well-being. I believe 
this is a more appropriate measure than traditional measures (i.e. employees’ pay, and 
subjective measures like survey response) because revenue volatility specifies to what 
extent the actual revenue deviates from the expected level of revenue.  
As such, I argue highly volatile revenue (in absolute value) presents high level of 
financial risk to a local jurisdiction, which in turn pushes local officials to seek 
alternative (i.e. more cost effective alternative) service delivery methods, such as 
outsourcing and purchasing from external actors to cut cost. By comparison, other things 
equal, a stable revenue stream may exert less pressure to local officials to seek 
contracting out services.   
So far, I have drawn a theoretical foundation for the paper. The next section 
specifies variable selection and model specification.  
3.3 Variable Selection and Model Specification 
 
3.3.1 Dependent Variable  
 
The dependent variable, following the lead of Fernandez, Ryu and Brudney (2008), 
is the number of services each government outsources with for-profit and nonprofit 
providers. The 2007 International City/County Management Association (ICMA) 
Alternative Service Delivery (ASD) survey covers sixty-seven municipal services’ 
delivery arrangements, which are grouped into six service areas (Public 
Works/Transportation, Public Utilities, Public Health and Safety, Parks and Recreation, 
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Cultural and Arts Programs, and Support Services); the dependent variable is a count of 
services contracted out in each of those service areas.  
The independent variables are constructed from three main sources. The first set of 
independent variables is TCE related variables. The second set consists of revenue 
volatility measures. And the last set contains other independent variables and control 
variables, which are adopted from the previous chapter of the thesis.  
3.3.2 Independent Variable: TCE 
 
The TCE variables include: asset specificity, contract management difficulty, and 
market competition. Those variables are borrowed from Hefetz and Warner’s newly 
published study. Based on ICMA 2007 ASD survey list, Hefetz and Warner conducted 
their own survey to obtain the TCE measure; those variables are presented by service 
type and metro status in Appendix A.  
In the ICMA Service Characteristics survey (Hefetz and Warner, 2012; p308-9), 
asset specificity is described as: 
Services that require special infrastructure (water pipes, treatment plants, 
ditch diggers) or technical expertise (legal, environmental) lead 
government managers to worry about lack of competitiveness in supplier 
markets and whether to maintain internal expertise or technical capacity. 
High asset specificity means the investments cannot be easily adapted to 
produce another service. Specific Infrastructure or Expertise was 
measured on a scale from low (1) to high (5). 
 
Contract specification is described as: 
Services hard to specify in a contract or monitor are less likely to be 
contracted out, or require a higher level of performance management 
expertise on the part of government. Contract specification and monitoring 
is measured on a scale from easy (1) to difficult (5). 
 
Market competition is described as: 
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For many services, there is only one supplier, government. When 
contracting,, competition is the key to cost savings and choice. Some 
governments face very limited markets of alternative suppliers, especially 
for some services. Competition was measured on the following scale: 0 = 
government only; 1 = one alternative provider; 2 = two alternative 
providers; 3= three alternative providers and 4+ = four or more alternative 
providers.  
 
3.3.3 Independent Variable: Revenue Volatility Measures 
 
Following Yan and Wang’s (2010) lead, I use two variables to capture both long-
term and short-term revenue volatility. Long-term revenue volatility measure is simply 
calculated as the standard deviation of municipalities’ general revenue.  
                                                           (1) 
Where  
•  denotes to long term revenue volatility for local government i at time t; 
•  represents standard deviation for local government i at time t; 
• RV denotes  general revenue for each municipality; 
•  is the mean of RV: . 
Short-term revenue volatility (SRV), based on municipalities’ general revenue time 
series data, is the difference between actual revenue and expected level of revenue. In 
order to calculate the short-term revenue volatility, there will be three steps involved. 
First, using ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator to obtain the expected level of 
revenue.  
                                                                      (2) 
Where 
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•  is the predicted revenue level; 
•  is an intercept for government i; 
•  is linear trend parameter for government i; 
•  is the time period year t. 
Short-term revenue volatility is thus obtained by: 
                                                                 (3) 
3.3.4 Other Independent Variables 
 
Table 3.1: Independent and Control Variables 
Variable Sources Exp. sign 
Total full time pay ($Millions) US Census Bureau  
Total full time equivalent (1,000)  US Census Bureau  
External involvement ICMA + 
Citizen opposition ICMA - 
Officials opposition ICMA - 
Demand small government ICMA + 
Legal restriction ICMA - 
Employee opposition ICMA - 
Ex ante evaluation  ICMA  
Monitoring capacity ICMA + 
Monitoring through survey ICMA + 
Reduce legal barriers ICMA + 
Insufficient provider ICMA - 
Tax ($Millions) U.S. Census Bureau  
Inter-governmental revenue ($Millions) U.S. Census Bureau  
Direct expenditure ($Millions) U.S. Census Bureau  
Short term debt ($Millions) U.S. Census Bureau + 
Long term debt-private purposes ($Millions) U.S. Census Bureau + 
Long term debt-public purposes ($Millions) U.S. Census Bureau + 
Population U.S. Census Bureau  
Long term revenue volatility  U.S. Census Bureau + 
Short term revenue volatility U.S. Census Bureau + 
TCE – Asset Specificity  Hefetz and Warner  
TCE – Contract Management difficulty Hefetz and Warner  
TCE – Market Competition Hefetz and Warner  
Region ICMA  
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A full set of internal determinants has been specified in the previous chapter, 
including political actors and institutions, socio-economic characteristics, demographic 
variables. Considering the similarity of the two studies, I adopted most of the variables 
here. Table 3.1 presents the variables, data sources, and expected signs. 
3.3.5 Model Specification 
 
Not all services are created equal; Lamothe and Lamothe (2010) categorize 
services into hard services (i.e. Building maintenance, refuse collection, and janitorial 
services) and soft services (i.e. child protective service) based on service properties. It is 
obvious that there is no one size fits all approach when outsourcing those different 
services. For example, a highly competitive market may help a procurer to obtain a better 
price on street maintenance. It may not be necessarily true for social services where 
competition could lead to vendor turnover, and in turn hurt patients who require 
consistent long-term health care (Lamothe and Lamothe, 2010). This situation suggests 
competition is a valuable market characteristic for hard services, but we may not be able 
to generalize the same benefit automatically in other service areas. Therefore, I analyze 
outsourcing decisions by service groups. As mentioned earlier, the ICMA ASD survey 
groups all municipal services into six area: Public Works/Transportation (20 individual 
services), Public Utilities (4 individual services), Public Health and Safety (21 individual 
services), Parks and Recreation (3 individual services), Cultural and Arts Programs (3 
individual services), and Support Services (15 individual services).  
The dependent variable is a count variable that counts the number of services 
outsourced in each service group, thus a limited dependent variable model is appropriate. 
The nature of a count variable with relatively few values lends its support to a Poisson 
65 
 
model (Wooldridge, 2009; Cameron, 2009). In addition, robust standard errors are 
estimated to mildly relax the underlying assumption that the data are Poisson distributed 
(Cameron and Pravin, 2009) 
A basic form of the model can be written as: 
 
or          
where  
• y is the dependent variable, which will be specified accordingly by each service 
groups; 
•  is intercept; 
• x is an  matrix of observations on k right-hand-side exogenous variables; 
•  is the corresponding  parameter vector. 
3.3.6 Factor Analysis 
 
As the analysis is performed based on service groups, one problem emerged. It is 
difficult to incorporate TCE variables (Asset Specificity, Contract Management 
Difficulty, and Market Competition) directly in the model as those variables are at 
individual service level whereas the rest of the variables are at city level. For example, 
Public Works/Transportation group has twenty individual services; if all three TCE 
variables are included in the model, there will be sixty (three variables * twenty 
individual services) more independent variables added. This is not only tedious to report, 
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but also prone to collinearity problem. As such, I factor analyzed all three TCE variables 
by each service area. 
3.3.6.1 Public Works/Transportation 
 
This service group consists of twenty different services in the public works and 
transportation area, including residential solid waste collection, street repair, traffic 
sign/signal installation/maintenance, inspection/code enforcement, operation/maintenance 
of bus transit system, operation of airport, water treatment, and distribution. Appendix C 
provides summary statistics of Asset Specificity, Contract Management Difficulty, and 
Market Competition for individual services.  
Table 3.2: Principle Components Analysis for Public Works/Transportation 
Public 
Works/Transportation Factor Eigenvalue Variance 
Proportion 
(%) 
Cumulative 
(%) 
Asset Specificity 1 13.04 12.89 64.43 64.43 2 6.96 7.11 35.57 100 
Contract Management 
Difficulty 
1 12.77 10.42 52.11 52.11 
2 7.23 9.58 47.89 100 
Market Competition 1 18.61 11.55 57.74 57.74 2 1.39 8.45 42.26 100 
 
Since services grouped in this category have similar characteristics and do not vary 
much in terms of their asset specificity, contract management difficulty, and market 
competition, it is appropriate to use factor analysis method to identify one or more 
common dimensions. Exploratory factor analysis assists me to determine underlying 
patterns in each of the three TCE variables, and I use principal components analysis to 
extract factors, the factors with eigenvalues equal or higher than 1 are retained. For asset 
specificity, two factors are retained (Table 3.2). Factor 1 accounts for 64% of the 
observed total variance and factor 2 accounts for 35%. There are also two factors retained 
for contract management difficulty. Factor 1 and 2 comprise 52.11% and 47.89% of the 
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variance respectively. Similarly, two factors of market competition are extracted from the 
market competition variable. The pattern matrix table can be found in Appendix B.  
3.3.6.2 Public Utilities 
 
Four municipal services fall into this group: electric utility operation and 
management, gas utility operation and management, utility meter reading, and utility 
billing. Table 3.4 below provides summary statistics on three TCE variables. 
Principal components analysis is used to extract common factors, the factors with 
eigenvalues equal or higher than 1 are retained. Table 3.3 provides information on 
eigenvalues and variance that the retained factors account for.  
Table 3.3: Principle Components Analysis for Public Utilities 
Public Utilities  Factor Eigenvalue Variance Proportion (%) 
Cumulative 
(%) 
Asset Specificity 1 3.19 3.19 79.83 79.83 
Contract Management 
Difficulty 1 3.05 3.05 76.28 76.28 
Market Competition 1 3.20 3.20 80.08 80.08 
 
One factor is extracted from each variable. The asset specificity factor accounts for 
79.83% of the variance. The factor of contract management difficulty and market 
competition comprises 76.28% and 80.08% of the total variance respectively.  
3.3.6.3 Public Health and Safety 
 
There are twenty-two individual services included in this service group, including 
crime prevention/patrol, emergency medical service, ambulance service, sanitary 
inspection, animal control, and drug and alcohol treatment programs. See Appendix C for 
summary statistics of asset specificity, contract management difficulty, and market 
competition. 
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Both asset specificity and contract management difficulty retain two factors, and 
only one factor remained for market competition (Table 3.4). Factor 1 and 2 of asset 
specificity represent 57.59% and 42.41% of the total variance. Two common factors of 
contract management difficulty account for 60.66% and 39.34% of the total variance, and 
the market competition factor accounts for all the variance in its group.  
Table 3.4: Principle Components Analysis for Public Health and Safety 
Public Safety Factor Eigenvalue Variance Proportion (%) 
Cumulative 
(%) 
Asset Specificity 1 12.76 12.67 57.59 57.59 2 9.23 9.33 42.41 100 
Contract Management 
Difficulty 
1 13.36 13.34 60.66 60.66 
2 8.64 8.66 39.34 100 
Market Competition 1 22.00 22.00 100 100 
3.3.6.4 Parks and Recreation 
 
This service section consists of operation and maintenance of recreation facilities, 
parks landscaping and maintenance, and operation of convention centers and auditoriums. 
Within this section, one common factor is identified for asset specificity and market 
competition. Asset specificity factor accounts for 67.49% of the total variance and market 
competition factor represents 98.14% (Table 3.5). Two factors are retained for contract 
management difficulty variable, first of which accounts for 64.49% of the total variance, 
and the other one depicts 35.51% of the total variance. 
Table 3.5: Principle Components Analysis for Parks and Recreation 
Parks and Recreation Factor Eigenvalue Variance Proportion (%) 
Cumulative 
(%) 
Asset Specificity 1 2.02 2.02 67.49 67.49 
Contract Management 
Difficulty 
1 1.99 1.94 64.49 64.49 
2 1.01 1.07 35.51 100 
Market Competition 1 2.94 2.94 98.14 98.14 
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3.3.6.5 Cultural and Arts Programs 
 
This section is composed of services like operation of cultural and arts programs, 
operation of libraries, and operation of museums. There are two factors retained for asset 
specificity variable. Only one factor is identified for both contract management difficulty  
and market competition . Table 3.6 presents the eigenvalue and the variance each factor 
accounts for.  
Table 3.6: Principle Components Analysis for Cultural and Arts Programs 
Cultural and Arts 
Programs Factor Eigenvalue Variance 
Proportion 
(%) 
Cumulative 
(%) 
Asset Specificity 1 1.98 1.67 55.68 55.68 2 1.02 1.32 44.32 100 
Contract Management 
Difficulty 1 2.21 2.21 73.51 73.51 
Market Competition 1 2.42 2.42 80.89 80.89 
 
3.3.6.6 Support Services 
 
This is the last group of services identified in ICMA ASD survey. Legal services, 
secretarial services, personnel services, building security, fleet management, payroll, and 
tax bill processing are all in this group, a total of fifteen services.  
Table 3.7: Principle Components Analysis for Support Services 
Support Services Factor Eigenvalue Variance Proportion (%) 
Cumulative 
(%) 
Asset Specificity 1 11.28 7.64 50.97 50.97 2 3.72 7.35 49.03 100 
Contract Management 
Difficulty 
1 8.02 7.79 51.95 51.95 
2 6.97 7.20 48.05 100 
Market Competition 1 13.98 7.53 50.21 50.21 2 1.02 7.46 49.79 100 
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Among those services, each of the three TCE variables identifies two common 
factors. There is a similar pattern can be seen in Table 3.7, each factor accounts roughly 
half of the total variance in the variable it represents. 
In sum, all the common factors in every service group have been identified and will 
be used in the subsequent analysis. A detailed factor loading pattern matrix for all the 
factor scores identified above can be found in Appendix B.  
The creation of all the factor scores completes the data set with 1,003 observations. 
Summary statistics for all the variables are shown in Table 3.8 and summary statistics for 
TCE factor scores are presented in Table 3.9. 
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Table 3.8: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent Variables 
Public Works/Transportation 4.54 3.44 0.00 17.00 
Public Utilities 0.70 1.29 0.00 4.00 
Public Safety 3.46 4.45 0.00 15.00 
Parks and Recreation 0.45 0.76 0.00 3.00 
Cultural and Arts Programs 0.66 0.94 0.00 3.00 
Support Services 3.29 2.94 0.00 13.00 
ICMA ASD Measures 
External involvement 0.67 0.99 0.00 6.00 
Citizen opposition 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Officials opposition 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Employee opposition 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Ex ante evaluation  0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Monitoring capacity 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Monitoring through survey 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Reduce legal barriers 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
Insufficient provider 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 
US Census Bureau Data 
Total full time pay per employee 4258.10 1112.67 1386.42 8570.25 
Tax ($Millions) 0.15 0.28 0.00 4.30 
Inter-governmental revenue ($Millions) 0.06 0.13 0.00 1.27 
Direct expenditure ($Millions) 0.36 0.74 0.00 13.42 
Short term debt ($Millions) 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.20 
Long term debt-private purposes ($Millions) 0.08 0.44 0.00 8.18 
Long term debt-public purposes ($Millions) 0.41 1.19 0.00 16.18 
Population (Millions) 0.05 0.10 0.00 1.55 
Region 2.54  1.00 4.00 
Revenue Volatility Measure 
Long term revenue volatility  237.99 142.84 178.37 2016.75 
Short term revenue volatility 7645.53 9767.70 0.89 135171.40 
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Table 3.9: Summary Statistics of Factor Scores of TCE Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Asset_Works_1 0.00 1.00 -1.64 1.56 
Asset_Works_2 0.00 1.00 -1.76 0.76 
Asset_Utility 0.00 1.00 -1.38 1.92 
Asset_Safety_1 0.00 1.00 -0.74 1.62 
Asset_Safety_2 0.00 1.00 -2.35 0.77 
Asset_Parks 0.00 1.00 -0.78 1.44 
Asset_Arts_1 0.00 1.00 -0.61 2.27 
Asset_Arts_2 0.00 1.00 -0.79 1.78 
Asset_Support_1 0.00 1.00 -0.79 1.34 
Asset_Support_2 0.00 1.00 -2.12 1.19 
Contract_Works_1 0.00 1.00 -1.78 0.79 
Contract_Works_2 0.00 1.00 -2.27 0.61 
Contract_Utility 0.00 1.00 -1.73 0.69 
Contract_Safety_1 0.00 1.00 -1.78 0.62 
Contract_Safety_2 0.00 1.00 -0.49 2.38 
Contract_Parks_1 0.00 1.00 -1.73 1.17 
Contract_Parks_2 0.00 1.00 -0.69 2.10 
Contract_Arts 0.00 1.00 -1.78 0.77 
Contract_Support_1 0.00 1.00 -0.63 1.77 
Contract_Support_2 0.00 1.00 -0.48 2.39 
Market_Works_1 0.00 1.00 -1.30 0.79 
Market_Works_2 0.00 1.00 -1.23 2.08 
Market_Utility 0.00 1.00 -1.76 0.65 
Market_Safety 0.00 1.00 -2.04 0.49 
Market_Parks 0.00 1.00 -1.79 0.57 
Market_Arts 0.00 1.00 -1.66 1.41 
Market_Support_1 0.00 1.00 -1.04 2.22 
Market_Support_2 0.00 1.00 -1.46 0.78 
3.4 Empirical Results 
 
In order to capture a comprehensive image of how volatile revenue and different 
transaction cost measures could affect the use of outsourcing, analyses are based on 
different service groups, which are categorized by ICMA ASD survey. Before 
performing the actual analysis, another problem must be addressed. The factor scores 
created for asset specificity, contract management difficulty, and market competition, are 
73 
 
highly correlated with each other (descriptive statistics and correlation matrices for TCE 
variables can be found in Appendix D). This may lead to a multicollinearity issue and 
potentially create large standard errors in the analysis. To curb such an issue, I introduce 
asset specificity, contract management difficulty, and market competition factor scores 
separately in the regression.  
3.4.1 Public Works/Transportation 
 
The results of the Poisson regression with total number of services outsourced in 
Public Works/Transportation as the dependent variable are shown in Table 3.10.  
Two ICMA survey measures are statistically significant, external stakeholder 
involvement and monitoring capacity. External stakeholder is an index score created from 
the survey question “Who outside your local government was involved in evaluating the 
feasibility of private service delivery”, the score ranging from 0 to 6 as the response 
include potential service providers, professional consultants, service recipients/customers, 
managers in other local governments, citizen advisory committees, and state agencies, 
leagues, and associations. Monitoring capacity is an indicator variable that describes 
whether a local government evaluates citizen satisfaction, cost, and compliance with 
standards of private service delivery. As expected, both external stakeholders’ 
involvement and monitoring capacity are positively correlated with the number of service 
outsourced. On average, one more external stakeholder’s involvement increases .076 
services outsourced in log count. If a local government beefs up its monitoring capacity, 
the city tends to, on average, have .27 more services outsourced in log count. Higher full 
time pay per employee increases the number of services outsourced, but the magnitude of  
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Table 3.10: Poisson Regression Results: Effect of Explanatory Variables on Number 
of Public Works/Transportation Services Outsourced 
Public Works/Transportation Coeff. 
Robust  
Std. Err. 
Significance 
ICMA ASD Measures 
External involvement 0.076 0.026 *** 
Citizen opposition -0.122 0.077  
Officials opposition 0.086 0.072  
Employee opposition -0.021 0.065  
Ex ante evaluation  0.053 0.054  
Monitoring capacity 0.271 0.112 ** 
Monitoring through survey -0.085 0.110  
Reduce legal barriers -0.080 0.120  
Insufficient provider 0.068 0.070  
US Census Bureau Data 
Total full time pay per employee (1,000s) 0.069 0.029 ** 
Total Tax Revenue -0.043 0.336  
Inter-governmental revenue  0.239 0.280  
Direct expenditure -0.068 0.161  
Short term debt -0.866 0.995  
Long term debt-private purposes 0.036 0.038  
Long term debt-public purposes -0.014 0.054  
Population 0.198 0.271  
Region-North Central -0.234 0.070 *** 
Region-South -0.212 0.078 *** 
Region-West -0.095 0.081  
Revenue Volatility Measure 
Long term revenue volatility  -9.03E-05 2.87E-04  
Short term revenue volatility 3.02E-06 3.71E-06  
Factor Scores of TCE Variables 
Asset_Works_1 -0.034 0.026  
Asset_Works_2 0.063 0.026 ** 
Contract_Works_1♦ 0.057 0.027 ** 
Contract_Works_2♦ 0.044 0.025 * 
Market_Works_1♠ 0.071 0.026 *** 
Market_Works_2♠ 0.014 0.025  
 
Note: *Significance at 10% level, ** Significance at 5% level, *** Significance at 1% level 
Tax, revenue, population, and expenditure variables are in millions. 
♦♠Factor scores are introduced into regression, along with other independent variables, separately. The 
coefficients and significance on other explanatory variables do not change. 
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the increase is rather small. The omitted group in region variable is Northeast. Comparing 
to Northeast, both North Central and South utilize outsourcing less.   
Neither revenue volatility measure shows up as statistically significant for services 
in public works and transportation. Interestingly, both the asset specificity measure and 
contract management difficulty measure exert positive impact on the use of outsourcing 
in this category. According to TCE theory, we would expect those two measures to be 
negatively correlated with the use of contracting out; however, we have to keep in mind 
that outsourcing services specified in this group (i.e. residential solid waste collection, 
street repair, traffic sign/signal installation/maintenance, water treatment, and etc.) have 
become less controversial and more commonplace. In addition, market competition, as 
expected, is positively correlated with the number of services outsourced.  
Although using log linear to interpret coefficient in Poisson regression is 
acceptable (Wooldridge, 2009; Cameron, 2009; Cameron and Trivedi, 2009), a better 
estimate could be obtained through marginal effects. The marginal effects are presented 
in Table 3.11.  
As the marginal effects results suggest, one unit increase in external involvement 
score increases .33 services outsourced in public works and transportation group. By 
comparison, with a discrete change from 0 to 1, having some form of mechanisms to 
monitor the service privatized, on average, increases the number of service outsourced by 
1.2. In addition, it is interesting to note that citizen opposition shows up as statistically 
significant. Experiencing opposition from citizen decreases service outsourced by .52. 
The marginal effect on full time pay per employee is negligible.  Local governments 
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located in the North Central or South regions, on average, outsource one less service 
comparing to cities in the Northeast. 
Table 3.11: Marginal Effects of Explanatory Variables on Number of Public 
Works/Transportation Services Outsourced 
Public Works/Transportation dy/dx  Std. Err. Significance 
ICMA ASD Measures 
External involvement 0.337 0.114 *** 
Citizen opposition -0.515 0.312 * 
Officials opposition 0.389 0.337  
Employee opposition -0.092 0.281  
Ex ante evaluation  0.238 0.246  
Monitoring capacity 1.206 0.504 ** 
Monitoring through survey -0.373 0.484  
Reduce legal barriers -0.341 0.491  
Insufficient provider 0.310 0.325  
US Census Bureau Data 
Total full time pay per employee (1,000s) 0.304 0.130 ** 
Total Tax Revenue -0.192 1.482  
Inter-governmental revenue  1.056 1.234  
Direct expenditure -0.298 0.712  
Short term debt -3.821 4.392  
Long term debt-private purposes 0.158 0.168  
Long term debt-public purposes -0.060 0.240  
Population 0.873 0  
Region-North Central -0.991 0.284 *** 
Region-South -0.895 0.316 *** 
Region-West -0.407 0.339  
Revenue Volatility Measure 
Long term revenue volatility  -3.985E-04 1.270E-03  
Short term revenue volatility 1.330E-05 2.000E-05  
Factor Scores of TCE Variables 
Asset_Works_1 -0.151 0.115  
Asset_Works_2 0.280 0.113 ** 
Contract_Works_1♦ 0.251 0.120 ** 
Contract_Works_2♦ 0.195 0.108 * 
Market_Works_1♠ 0.312 0.116 *** 
Market_Works_2♠ 0.062 0.112  
 
Note: *Significance at 10% level, ** Significance at 5% level, *** Significance at 1% level 
Tax, revenue, population and expenditure variables are in millions. 
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3.4.2 Public Utilities 
 
There are total of four services listed in this section: electric utility operation and 
management, gas utility operation and management, utility meter reading and utility 
billing. The total number of services provided through outsourcing ranges from 0 to 4, 
with an average of .70. The results of the Poisson regression for this section are shown in 
Table 3.12.  
Three variables show up statistically significant in this section. Both long term debt 
and short term revenue volatility contribute to the use of outsourcing as a means to 
delivery utility services.  
Comparing to the results from public works and transportation, region is less 
significant for outsourcing utilities services. Only the North Central region uses less 
private provision for utility services. TCE factor scores do not show any statistical 
significance this time. To better understand the magnitude of the impacts, marginal 
effects results are listed in Table 3.13. 
Citizen opposition shows up statistically significant. Citizen opposition decreases 
the number of service outsourced by .22.  Two economic measures that are statistically 
significant are long term private debt and short term revenue volatility. Long term private 
debt varies from zero to eight million dollars. With one million dollars increase in debt, 
the number of utility service outsourced increase by .07. I have also calculated the 
predicted counts of service outsourced at different debt levels, holding other variables in 
the model at their mean values. The results are presented in Table 3.14. By comparison, 
the magnitude of short term revenue volatility is rather small. 
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Table 3.12: Poisson Regression Effect of Explanatory Variables on Number of 
Public Utility Services Outsourced 
Public Utility Coeff. 
Robust  
Std. Err. 
Significance 
ICMA ASD Measures 
External involvement 0.079 0.066  
Citizen opposition -0.387 0.259  
Officials opposition -0.091 0.209  
Employee opposition -0.104 0.177  
Ex ante evaluation  0.094 0.155  
Monitoring capacity -0.131 0.324  
Monitoring through survey -0.110 0.325  
Reduce legal barriers 0.232 0.314  
Insufficient provider 0.100 0.189  
US Census Bureau Data 
Total full time pay per employee (1,000s) -0.036 0.071  
Total Tax Revenue -0.399 0.869  
Inter-governmental revenue  0.470 0.698  
Direct expenditure -0.144 0.367  
Short term debt -0.890 2.807  
Long term debt-private purposes 0.100 0.043 ** 
Long term debt-public purposes 0.108 0.116  
Population -0.914 0.894  
Region-North Central -0.328 0.185 * 
Region-South -0.329 0.209  
Region-West 0.034 0.195  
Revenue Volatility Measure 
Long term revenue volatility  -6.00E-04 6.31E-04  
Short term revenue volatility 2.13E-05 9.38E-06 ** 
Factor Scores of TCE Variables 
Asset_Utility 0.053 0.080  
Contract_Utility 0.061 0.080  
Market_Utility♠ 0.093 0.068  
 
Note: *Significance at 10% level, ** Significance at 5% level, *** Significance at 1% level 
Tax, revenue, population and expenditure variables are in millions. 
♠Factor score is introduced into regression, along with other explanatory independent variables, 
separately. The coefficients and significance on other variables do not change. 
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Table 3.13: Marginal Effects of Explanatory Variables on Number of Public Utility 
Services Outsourced 
Public Utility dy/dx  Std. Err. Significance 
ICMA ASD Measures 
External involvement 0.053 0.044  
Citizen opposition -0.223 0.128 * 
Officials opposition -0.059 0.130  
Employee opposition -0.067 0.110  
Ex ante evaluation  0.064 0.107  
Monitoring capacity -0.087 0.215  
Monitoring through survey -0.073 0.215  
Reduce legal barriers 0.172 0.259  
Insufficient provider 0.069 0.136  
US Census Bureau Data 
Total full time pay per employee (1,000s) -0.024 0.050  
Total Tax Revenue -0.265 0.575  
Inter-governmental revenue  0.312 0.464  
Direct expenditure -0.096 0.244  
Short term debt -0.591 1.866  
Long term debt-private purposes 0.066 0.029 ** 
Long term debt-public purposes 0.072 0.077  
Population -0.607 0  
Region-North Central -0.206 0.109 * 
Region-South -0.204 0.122 * 
Region-West 0.023 0.132  
Revenue Volatility Measure 
Long term revenue volatility  -3.99E-04 4.20E-04  
Short term revenue volatility 1.41E-05 1.00E-05 ** 
Factor Scores of TCE Variables 
Asset_Utility 0.035 0.053  
Contract_Utility 0.041 0.053  
Market_Utility♠ 0.062 0.045  
 
Note: *Significance at 10% level, ** Significance at 5% level, *** Significance at 1% level 
Tax, revenue, population and expenditure variables are in millions. 
 
  
80 
 
Table 3.14: Marginal Effect of Private Long Term Debt on Public Utility 
Outsourcing 
Debt Level Margin Std. Err. 
0 0.692 0.040 
1 0.765 0.050 
2 0.846 0.079 
3 0.935 0.122 
4 1.033 0.177 
5 1.142 0.243 
6 1.262 0.321 
7 1.395 0.415 
8 1.541 0.524 
Note: debt level is in millions of dollars. 
 
3.4.3 Public Health and Safety 
 
This service section consists of crime prevention/patrol, fire prevention, ambulance 
service, public health programs, and eighteen other public health and safety services. The 
number of services outsourced in this group varies from zero to fifteen with an average of 
3.46. The regression results are presented below (Table 3.15).   
Neither TCE variables nor revenue volatility measures show any statistical 
significance; the variables that matter are private long term debt and west region. Private 
long term debt positively correlate with the number of services outsourced. To be exact, 
one more million in debt increases the number of services outsourced by .9 log count.  
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Table 3.15: Poisson Regression: Effect of Explanatory Variables on Number of 
Public Health and Safety Services Outsourced 
Public Health and Safety Coeff. 
Robust  
Std. Err. 
Significance 
ICMA ASD Measures 
External involvement 0.049 0.045  
Citizen opposition -0.152 0.144  
Officials opposition -0.052 0.126  
Employee opposition 0.086 0.112  
Ex ante evaluation  -0.114 0.103  
Monitoring capacity 0.207 0.222  
Monitoring through survey -0.158 0.224  
Reduce legal barriers 0.214 0.195  
Insufficient provider 0.123 0.118  
US Census Bureau Data 
Total full time pay per employee (1,000s) -0.006 0.049  
Total Tax Revenue -0.793 0.613  
Inter-governmental revenue  0.348 0.540  
Direct expenditure 0.042 0.326  
Short term debt -1.910 1.870  
Long term debt-private purposes 0.089 0.033 *** 
Long term debt-public purposes 0.024 0.093  
Population -0.479 0.403  
Region-North Central -0.175 0.133  
Region-South -0.020 0.145  
Region-West 0.312 0.140 ** 
Revenue Volatility Measure 
Long term revenue volatility  5.336E-04 3.708E-04  
Short term revenue volatility 8.720E-07 6.000E-06  
Factor Scores of TCE Variables 
Asset_Safety_1 -0.009 0.045  
Asset_Safety_2 -0.014 0.044  
Contract_Safety_1♦ 0.013 0.046  
Contract_Safety_2♦ 0.010 0.044  
Market_Safety_1♠ -0.012 0.050  
 
Note: *Significance at 10% level, ** Significance at 5% level, *** Significance at 1% level 
Tax, revenue, population and expenditure variables are in millions. 
♦♠Factor scores are introduced into regression, along with other independent variables, separately. The 
coefficients and significance on other explanatory variables do not change. 
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Table 3.16: Marginal Effects of Explanatory Variables on Number of Public Health 
and Safety Services Outsourced 
Public Health and Safety dy/dx  Std. Err. Significance 
ICMA ASD Measures 
External involvement 0.164 0.151  
Citizen opposition -0.481 0.431  
Officials opposition -0.172 0.406  
Employee opposition 0.295 0.396  
Ex ante evaluation  -0.373 0.328  
Monitoring capacity 0.696 0.752  
Monitoring through survey -0.526 0.742  
Reduce legal barriers 0.792 0.797  
Insufficient provider 0.430 0.433  
US Census Bureau Data 
Total full time pay per employee (1,000s) -0.021 0.160  
Total Tax Revenue -2.651 2.052  
Inter-governmental revenue  1.164 1.803  
Direct expenditure 0.141 1.091  
Short term debt -6.387 6.271  
Long term debt-private purposes 0.299 0.108 *** 
Long term debt-public purposes 0.079 0.310  
Population -1.600 0  
Region-North Central -0.567 0.418  
Region-South -0.068 0.480  
Region-West 1.142 0.561 ** 
Revenue Volatility Measure 
Long term revenue volatility  0.002 0.001  
Short term revenue volatility 2.920E-06 2.000E-05  
Factor Scores of TCE Variables 
Asset_Safety_1 -0.029 0.151  
Asset_Safety_2 -0.045 0.148  
Contract_Safety_1♦ 0.042 0.153  
Contract_Safety_2♦ 0.033 0.146  
Market_Safety_1♠ -0.038 0.167  
 
Note: *Significance at 10% level, ** Significance at 5% level, *** Significance at 1% level 
Tax, revenue, population and expenditure variables are in millions. 
 
Localities in West region use more private service provision for public health and 
safety services than local governments in Northeast region. Marginal effects (Table 3.16) 
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indicate that a $1 million increase in private long term debt leads to .30 more services 
outsourced in the area of public health and safety. Whether a city is located in West 
region or not has a considerable marginal effect (1.14) on the use of privatization for 
public health and safety services. 
3.4.4 Parks and Recreation 
 
Operation and maintenance of recreation facilities, parks landscaping and 
maintenance and operation of convention centers and auditoriums are listed under parks 
and recreation services. The average number outsourced in this section is .45. The 
regression results are shown in Table 3.17. 
For parks and recreation services, ex ante evaluation and external involvement are 
positively correlated with the use of privatization, whereas the total tax revenue is 
negatively correlated with it. Ex ante evaluation is an indicator variable that shows 
whether a local government identified successful privatization initiatives in other 
jurisdictions, established a citizens’ advisory committee on privatization, and hired 
consultants to study the feasibility of privatization prior to outsourcing a service. A local 
government adopting such an effort tends to have, on average, .28 log count services 
outsourced in parks and recreation services. External stakeholders’ involvement also 
contributes to the use of privatization in this area. Total tax revenue, as expected, exerts 
negative pressure on the use of privatization since higher tax revenue indicates a local 
government is less likely to subject to fiscal stress. Marginal effects of such variables are 
shown in Table 3.18. 
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Table 3.17: Poisson Regression: Effect of Explanatory Variables on Number of 
Parks and Recreation Services Outsourced 
Parks and Recreation Coeff. 
Robust  
Std. Err. 
Significance 
ICMA ASD Measures 
External involvement 0.101 0.056 * 
Citizen opposition -0.128 0.184  
Officials opposition 0.134 0.149  
Employee opposition 0.094 0.136  
Ex ante evaluation  0.276 0.127 ** 
Monitoring capacity 0.110 0.411  
Monitoring through survey 0.048 0.410  
Reduce legal barriers -0.197 0.269  
Insufficient provider 0.051 0.144  
US Census Bureau Data 
Total full time pay per employee (1,000s) 0.095 0.065  
Total Tax Revenue -1.466 0.884 * 
Inter-governmental revenue  0.111 0.774  
Direct expenditure 0.194 0.387  
Short term debt -0.933 2.548  
Long term debt-private purposes -0.078 0.130  
Long term debt-public purposes 0.114 0.116  
Population 1.050 0.723  
Region-North Central 0.101 0.186  
Region-South -0.029 0.204  
Region-West 0.169 0.194  
Revenue Volatility Measure 
Long term revenue volatility  -2.49E-05 5.86E-04  
Short term revenue volatility 2.76E-07 7.51E-06  
Factor Scores of TCE Variables 
Asset_Parks_1 -0.046 0.070  
Contract_Parks_1 -0.052 0.072  
Contract_Parks_2♦ -0.044 0.058  
Market_Parks_1♦ -0.026 0.063  
Note: *Significance at 10% level, ** Significance at 5% level, *** Significance at 1% level 
Tax, revenue, population and expenditure variables are in millions. 
♦Factor scores of Asset Specificity, Contract Management Difficulty, and Market Competition are 
introduced into regression, along with other independent variables, separately. The coefficients and 
significance on other variables do not change. 
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Table 3.18: Marginal Effects of Explanatory Variables on Number of Parks and 
Recreation Services Outsourced 
Parks and Recreation dy/dx  Std. Err. Significance 
ICMA ASD Measures 
External involvement 0.043 0.024 * 
Citizen opposition -0.052 0.071  
Officials opposition 0.059 0.069  
Employee opposition 0.041 0.061  
Ex ante evaluation  0.125 0.061 ** 
Monitoring capacity 0.047 0.175  
Monitoring through survey 0.021 0.175  
Reduce legal barriers -0.076 0.095  
Insufficient provider 0.022 0.063  
US Census Bureau Data 
Total full time pay per employee (1,000s) 0.041 0.030  
Total Tax Revenue -0.622 0.375 * 
Inter-governmental revenue  0.047 0.329  
Direct expenditure 0.082 0.164  
Short term debt -0.396 1.082  
Long term debt-private purposes -0.033 0.055  
Long term debt-public purposes 0.048 0.049  
Population 0.445 0  
Region-North Central 0.044 0.082  
Region-South -0.012 0.085  
Region-West 0.075 0.090  
Revenue Volatility Measure 
Long term revenue volatility  -1.06E-05 2.50E-04  
Short term revenue volatility 1.17E-07 0  
Factor Scores of TCE Variables 
Asset_Parks_1 -0.020 0.030  
Contract_Parks_1 -0.022 0.030  
Contract_Parks_2♦ -0.019 0.024  
Market_Parks_1♦ -0.011 0.027  
 
Note: *Significance at 10% level, ** Significance at 5% level, *** Significance at 1% level 
Tax, revenue, population and expenditure variables are in millions. 
 
The same variables showed up statistically significant in marginal effect results. 
One more external stakeholder involved in the process increases the service outsourced 
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by .04.  Ex ante evaluation is also positively correlated with the number of services 
privatized. Evaluating the feasibility of outsourcing a service contributes to .13 more 
services outsourced. When holding other explanatory variables at their mean values, 
higher tax revenue reduces the number of services outsourced. As shown in table 3.19, 
when tax revenue is less than a million dollars, the average service privatized is .67; 
when tax revenue hits the two million dollar mark, the number of services outsourced 
drops to .04. This actually confirms the assumption that financially struggling local 
governments are more likely to turn to privatization to stretch public dollars.  
Table 3.19: Marginal Effect of Tax Revenue on Parks and Recreation 
Tax Revenue Margin Std. Err. 
0 0.667 0.376 
1 0.154 0.055 
2 0.036 0.044 
3 0.008 0.017 
4 0.002 0.006 
Note: tax revenue is in millions of dollars. 
 
3.4.5 Cultural and Arts Programs 
 
Cultural and arts programs include operation of cultural and arts programs, 
operation of libraries and operation of museums. Among the U.S. local governments, .66 
services are provided through private provision on average. Regression results are 
presented in Table 3.20. 
None of the TCE variables nor volatility measures contribute to the use of private 
provision for cultural and arts programs. External involvement is again positively 
correlated with number of cultural and arts programs outsourced and the West region 
utilizes private provision for libraries and museums more than the Northeast region. The 
magnitude of marginal effects is shown in the table below (Table 3.21). 
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Table 3.20: Poisson Regression: Effect of Explanatory Variables on Number of 
Cultural and Arts Programs Outsourced 
Cultural and Arts Programs Coeff. 
Robust  
Std. Err. 
Significance 
ICMA ASD Measures 
External involvement 0.084 0.050 * 
Citizen opposition -0.220 0.173  
Officials opposition 0.120 0.145  
Employee opposition 0.082 0.125  
Ex ante evaluation  -0.082 0.118  
Monitoring capacity 0.084 0.236  
Monitoring through survey -0.075 0.238  
Reduce legal barriers -0.082 0.275  
Insufficient provider 0.143 0.132  
US Census Bureau Data 
Total full time pay per employee (1,000s) 0.036 0.055  
Total Tax Revenue -1.141 0.709  
Inter-governmental revenue  0.170 0.600  
Direct expenditure 0.418 0.321  
Short term debt -0.770 2.383  
Long term debt-private purposes 0.055 0.051  
Long term debt-public purposes -0.103 0.103  
Population 0.153 0.473  
Region-North Central -0.145 0.158  
Region-South 0.117 0.159  
Region-West 0.282 0.162 * 
Revenue Volatility Measure 
Long term revenue volatility  4.20E-04 5.06E-04  
Short term revenue volatility -3.88E-06 7.09E-06  
Factor Scores of TCE Variables 
Asset_Arts_1 0.064 0.048  
Asset_Arts_2 0.064 0.048  
Contract_Arts♦ -0.063 0.049  
Market_Arts♠ -0.041 0.050  
Note: *Significance at 10% level, ** Significance at 5% level, *** Significance at 1% level 
Tax, revenue, population and expenditure variables are in millions. 
♦♠Factor scores of Asset Specificity, Contract Management Difficulty, and Market Competition are 
introduced into regression, along with other independent variables, separately. The coefficients and 
significance on other variables do not change. 
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Table 3.21: Marginal Effects of Explanatory Variables on Number of Cultural and 
Arts Programs Outsourced 
Cultural and Arts Programs dy/dx  Std. Err. Significance 
ICMA ASD Measures 
External involvement 0.054 0.032 * 
Citizen opposition -0.131 0.092  
Officials opposition 0.083 0.099  
Employee opposition 0.056 0.084  
Ex ante evaluation  -0.047 0.073  
Monitoring capacity 0.052 0.149  
Monitoring through survey -0.048 0.149  
Reduce legal barriers -0.051 0.161  
Insufficient provider 0.105 0.093  
US Census Bureau Data 
Total full time pay per employee (1,000s) 0.019 0.030  
Total Tax Revenue -0.721 0.447  
Inter-governmental revenue  0.055 0.378  
Direct expenditure 0.309 0.206  
Short term debt -0.400 1.472  
Long term debt-private purposes 0.036 0.030  
Long term debt-public purposes -0.081 0.066  
Population 0.270 0  
Region-North Central -0.088 0.095  
Region-South 0.088 0.106  
Region-West 0.194 0.120  
Revenue Volatility Measure 
Long term revenue volatility  2.72E-04 3.30E-04  
Short term revenue volatility -2.73E-06 0  
Factor Scores of TCE Variables 
Asset_Arts_1 0.040 0.030  
Asset_Arts_2 0.040 0.030  
Contract_Arts♦ -0.040 0.031  
Market_Arts♠ -0.026 0.032  
 
Note: *Significance at 10% level, ** Significance at 5% level, *** Significance at 1% level 
Tax, revenue, population and expenditure variables are in millions. 
As we can see, only external stakeholder involvement shows statistical 
significance; one more unit change leads to .05 more services outsourced. 
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3.4.6 Support Services 
 
Services such as buildings and grounds maintenance, fleet management, vehicle 
maintenance, legal services and personnel services are categorized into support services.  
There are fifteen individual services in this section, and the number of service 
outsourced varies from zero to thirteen. On average, 3.29 services are provided through 
private provision among the U.S. local jurisdictions. Table 3.22 provides the regression 
results. 
There are seven variables that are statistically significant, all of which behave as 
hypothesized. External stakeholders’ involvement and monitoring capacity are positively 
correlated to the number of services outsourced in the support services group, whereas 
insufficient providers impede the use of outsourcing. Higher asset specificity and a 
complicated contract to oversee lead to the services produced in-house, and a robust 
market with multiple potential service providers contribute to higher number of support 
services provided through private provision. The marginal effects of those variables are 
shown in Table 3.23. 
Involving more external stakeholders on board to evaluate the feasibility of 
outsourcing a service leads to higher number of services outsourced, to be more specific, 
one more external stakeholder contributes to .23 more services. Having a mechanism to 
ensure the quality of service outsourced also has a positive impact on the total number of 
services provided through private provision. A discrete change from not having one to 
having one in place leads to 1.12 more services outsourced. Experiencing insufficient 
potential providers reduces the total number of services outsourced by .66.  
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Table 3.22: Poisson Regression: Effect of Explanatory Variable on Number of 
Support Services Outsourced 
Support Services Coeff. 
Robust  
Std. Err. 
Significance 
ICMA ASD Measures 
External involvement 0.072 0.031 ** 
Citizen opposition -0.121 0.103  
Officials opposition -0.016 0.092  
Employee opposition 0.107 0.077  
Ex ante evaluation  0.037 0.074  
Monitoring capacity 0.342 0.149 ** 
Monitoring through survey -0.223 0.147  
Reduce legal barriers -0.196 0.160  
Insufficient provider -0.189 0.081 ** 
US Census Bureau Data 
Total full time pay per employee (1,000s) 0.014 0.034  
Total Tax Revenue -0.219 0.449  
Inter-governmental revenue  -0.031 0.379  
Direct expenditure -0.192 0.227  
Short term debt 0.919 1.122  
Long term debt-private purposes 0.038 0.042  
Long term debt-public purposes 0.101 0.063  
Population 0.343 0.314  
Region-North Central -0.125 0.091  
Region-South 0.030 0.096  
Region-West 0.088 0.099  
Revenue Volatility Measure 
Long term revenue volatility  2.55E-04 3.61E-04  
Short term revenue volatility -1.55E-07 5.49E-06  
Factor Scores of TCE Variables 
Asset_SupportService_1 -0.081 0.031 ** 
Asset_ SupportService _2 0.025 0.032  
Contract_ SupportService _1♦ -0.054 0.032 * 
Contract_ SupportService _2♦ -0.066 0.032 ** 
Market_ SupportService _1♠ -0.033 0.032  
Market_ SupportService _2♠ 0.078 0.032 ** 
 
Note: *Significance at 10% level, ** Significance at 5% level, *** Significance at 1% level 
Tax, revenue, population and expenditure variables are in millions. 
♦♠Factor scores are introduced into regression, along with other independent variables, separately. The 
coefficients and significance on other explanatory variables do not change. 
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Table 3.23: Marginal Effects of Explanatory Variables on Number of Support 
Services Outsourced 
Support Services dy/dx  Std. Err. Significance 
ICMA ASD Measures 
External involvement 0.234 0.099 ** 
Citizen opposition -0.373 0.303  
Officials opposition -0.052 0.293  
Employee opposition 0.357 0.265  
Ex ante evaluation  0.120 0.243  
Monitoring capacity 1.118 0.493 ** 
Monitoring through survey -0.716 0.469  
Reduce legal barriers -0.579 0.429  
Insufficient provider -0.658 0.304 ** 
US Census Bureau Data 
Total full time pay per employee (1,000s) 0.045 0.110  
Total Tax Revenue -0.706 1.449  
Inter-governmental revenue  -0.101 1.223  
Direct expenditure -0.622 0.734  
Short term debt 2.968 3.618  
Long term debt-private purposes 0.124 0.136  
Long term debt-public purposes 0.325 0.202  
Population 1.110 0  
Region-North Central -0.394 0.280  
Region-South 0.098 0.313  
Region-West 0.291 0.334  
Revenue Volatility Measure 
Long term revenue volatility  8.24E-04 1.17E-03  
Short term revenue volatility -4.99E-07 2.00E-05  
Factor Scores of TCE Variables 
Asset_SupportServices_1 -0.262 0.101 *** 
Asset_ SupportServices _2 0.081 0.104  
Contract_ SupportServices _1♦ -0.174 0.104 * 
Contract_ SupportServices _2♦ -0.212 0.102 ** 
Market_ SupportServices _1♠ -0.108 0.104  
Market_ SupportServices _2♠ 0.252 0.102 ** 
 
Note: *Significance at 10% level, ** Significance at 5% level, *** Significance at 1% level 
Tax, revenue, population and expenditure variables are in millions. 
 
All TCE factor scores have the same impact on total number of services outsourced 
as the TCE theory suggests. High asset specificity leads to channel integration, which 
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means producing in-house is a preferred option. The marginal effects suggest one unit 
change in asset specificity reduces total number of service privatized by .26.  
In addition, a contract that is difficult to manage and oversee also exerts negative 
pressure on the use of privatization. The first common factor in contract management 
difficulty indicates a one-unit increase actually decreases total number of services 
outsourced by .17. By comparison, second factor score in contract management difficulty 
group contributes to .21 less services privatized with a one-unit change. Market 
competition, on the other hand, is positively correlated with the use of privatization in the 
support services group. One unit increase in the factor score leads to .25 more services 
outsourced.  
In sum, Table 3.24 summarizes all the results presented above. There are several 
variables that are particularly worth noting. External stakeholders’ involvement is critical 
in terms of implementing outsourcing at the municipal level. The variable shows 
statistical significance in all service groups except in Public Utility and Public Health and 
Safety. Region is another important indicator to show the total number of services 
privatized. Generally speaking, comparing to Northeast region, local jurisdictions located 
in North Central and South region are less likely to use private provision to provide 
public services, whereas localities in West region tends to utilize privatization more in 
service areas like Public Health and Safety and Cultural and Arts Programs.  Revenue 
volatility measures do not have much impact on the use of privatization. There are two 
possible reasons for that: first, local government officials may not take revenue volatility 
into consideration when making outsourcing decisions. Second, the revenue volatility 
measures specified in the paper may not be good enough to capture the level of fiscal 
93 
 
stress at municipal level. If the latter is true, future improvement on the volatility measure 
is needed.  
Table 3.24: Summary Results of All Service Groups 
Summary Results Works Utility Safety Park Art Supp 
ICMA ASD Measures 
External involvement +   + + + 
Citizen opposition       
Officials opposition       
Employee opposition       
Ex ante evaluation    +   
Monitoring capacity +     + 
Monitoring through survey       
Reduce legal barriers       
Insufficient provider      - 
US Census Bureau Data 
Total full time pay per 
employee 
+      
Total Tax Revenue    -   
Inter-governmental revenue       
Direct expenditure       
Short term debt       
Long term debt-private 
purposes 
 + +    
Long term debt-public 
purposes 
      
Population       
Region-North Central - -     
Region-South -      
Region-West   +  +  
Revenue Volatility Measure 
Long term revenue volatility       
Short term revenue 
volatility 
 +     
Factor Scores of TCE Variables 
Asset_Specificity_1      - 
Asset_Specificity_2 +      
Contract_ Difficulty _1 +     - 
Contract_Difficulty_2 +     - 
Market_Competition_1 +      
Market_Competition_2      + 
Note: *Significance at 10% level, ** Significance at 5% level, *** Significance at 1% level 
Tax, revenue, population and expenditure variables are in millions. 
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TCE variables receive limited support from the empirical results. They behaved as 
hypothesized only in the support services group. Higher asset specificity and higher 
contract management difficulty leads to closer cooperation between service vendors and 
service providers, in public sector, which means services are better off produced in-house 
or through inter municipal cooperation. In Public Works and Transportation section, 
however, TCE variables showed reverse effects. Higher asset specificity and higher 
contract management difficulty all lead to more outsourcing. The reason might be the use 
of privatization in this service area has become more commonplace and local 
governments may just follow the trend without fully evaluating the market 
characteristics. 
3.5 Conclusions 
 
The TCE theory, complemented with revenue volatility measures, provides a useful 
analytical lens to examine government procurement and help us disentangle the 
mechanisms that drive public services’ outsourcing. To the best of my knowledge, to date 
there are no studies that have applied TCE theory and revenue volatility to address 
contractual relationship simultaneously. This article fills in part of the gap and helps to 
broaden the way in which we analyze public procurement decisions at local level.   
The results presented above indicate that there are a number of policy implications 
that could facilitate private provision in service delivery arrangement in the future.  
Municipalities with more stakeholders involved in evaluating the feasibility of 
outsourcing a service are more likely to have more services provided through private 
provision. Although the revenue volatility measure does not show any statistical 
significance, the long term debt, which is positively associated with the number of 
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services outsourced and tax revenue, which is negatively correlated with the number of 
service privatized, together may indicate local governments facing financial hardship turn 
to privatization to stretch public dollars.  In addition, caution must be exercised when 
outsourcing services in Public Works and Transportation. The empirical results show 
services are privatized regardless of the high asset specificity and contract management 
difficulty. In such case, it is always a good idea to get more external stakeholders on 
board to evaluate the feasibility and work with other local governments if privatization 
must proceed.  
Although the analysis sheds some light on disentangling determinants that 
contribute to the use of privatization, it is subject to a few limitations. First, TCE 
variables are subject to a collinearity problem due to the relatively small sample. Only 
164 places responded to Hefetz and Warner’s (2012) ICMA service characteristics 
survey. Because revenue volatility measures do not matter much in the analysis, it may be 
an indication that the method used to extract volatility measure is not good enough to use 
as a proxy for financial hardship. Future research should improve on those two areas. In 
addition, analyzing outsourcing decisions by service groups may lose some insights on 
individual services. Therefore, the research provides a number of future avenues for 
research focusing on key individual services rather than service groups.  
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Zhiwei Zhang 2013  
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Chapter 4. Summary and Future Research 
Privatization is neither a panacea for all the public sector’s problems, nor is there a 
“one size fits all” approach that can be applied to all public organizations. However, the 
importance of using privatization as a means to reduce cost and cushion financial 
uncertainty cannot be undermined. Ample examples have been shown in the dissertation 
to illustrate such a point. Moreover, the fight over the Republican’s Medicare 
privatization proposal certainly brought privatization to the forefront again. Advocates 
and opponents fiercely debate whether or not to increase the pace of outsourcing 
government provided services. There are numerous scholars who have devoted their 
research to such phenomena; a general consensus about what to privatize and how to 
properly privatize is yet to be reached. This dissertation attempts to fill in part of the gap. 
By adopting spatial techniques, measures for market characteristics, and level of fiscal 
uncertainty, the dissertation disentangles the common determinants that contribute to the 
use of outsourcing and specifies suitable conditions that welcome the use of outsourcing. 
4.1. Dissertation Summary 
 
Chapter two contributes to the literature in explaining why the use of outsourcing is 
so prevalent across the U.S. despite the constant opposition and criticisms. The study 
deviates from previous research by introducing spatial techniques to identify 
determinants of privatization. This study examines comprehensively privatization 
practices at the local level. The dataset contains more than 1000 municipalities. The 
estimation is based on cross-section data from 2007 using a spatial autoregressive model 
with spatial autoregressive disturbances.  
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The study identifies a positive spatial autocorrelation for sourcing decisions, which 
indicates a local government’s sourcing decision is not solely based on internal 
determinants. Nearby local jurisdictions affect its decision making process. One 
important policy implication that could derive from this is that learning from other nearby 
local jurisdictions is essential for public officials who consider the use of outsourcing. 
There are two obvious benefits. First, such practice could help local officials gain 
knowledge about the use of outsourcing as a service delivery option. It also helps them 
identify dos and don’ts prior to outsourcing a service. Second, connecting with nearby 
localities provides elected officials potential opportunities for inter-municipal 
cooperation. This is especially helpful to cope with situations such as when the private 
market is not competitive and/or not enough service vendors could be identified. Inter-
municipal cooperation also helps neighboring governments to achieve economies of 
scale.  
Other results suggest the form and location of local governments matter when it 
comes to privatization. More specifically, localities in the North Central and South 
regions tend to privatize less compared to those in the Northeast region. Suburban cities 
rely more on outsourcing than central cities. In addition, external stakeholders’ 
involvement and monitoring capacity exert positive pressure on the use of outsourcing, 
whereas a limited supply of private vendors impedes it. As such, getting more external 
stakeholders on board also helps to facilitate the use of outsourcing. In addition, 
enhanced monitoring capacity helps ensure the quality of the service outsourced, which 
in turn boosts the use of privatization. To deal with limited availability of potential 
service providers, one approach, as identified above, is to contract out with nearby local 
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governments. Another solution is to broaden the search; it is possible that there might be 
a robust national market when local competition is lacking. 
Chapter three attempts to specify the conditions under which it is optimal to buy 
and under which it is optimal to produce in-house, so that when a city decides to 
outsource, it can claim the benefits (cost saving, improved performance) and avoid 
hazardous outcomes (pay disputes, corruption, pension scandals). The contribution of this 
chapter is to combine the transaction cost economics (TCE) framework with a revenue 
volatility measure to analyze contracting decisions. The estimation is based on different 
service areas that are specified by ICMA ASD survey: Public Works/Transportation, 
Public Utilities, Public Health and Safety, Parks and Recreation, Cultural and Arts 
Programs, and Support Services.  
While all results are not entirely robust, there are several variables that are 
particularly worth noting. External stakeholders’ involvement is critical in terms of 
implementing outsourcing at the municipal level. The variable shows statistical 
significance in all service groups except in Public Utility and Public Health and Safety. 
Region is another important indicator to show the total number of services privatized. 
Generally speaking, comparing to Northeast region, local jurisdictions located in North 
Central and South region are less likely to use private provision to provide public 
services, whereas localities in West region tends to utilize privatization more in service 
areas like Public Health and Safety and Cultural and Arts Programs.  Revenue volatility 
measures do not have much impact on the use of privatization. There are two possible 
reasons for that: first, local government officials may not take revenue volatility into 
consideration when making outsourcing decisions. Second, the revenue volatility 
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measures specified in the paper may not be good enough to capture the level of fiscal 
stress as it is experienced at the municipal level. If the latter is true, future improvement 
on the volatility measure is needed.  
TCE variables received limited support from the empirical results, the expectations 
hold in the support services group, which indicate higher asset specificity and higher 
contract management difficulty lead to less contracting out. It is a totally different story 
in Public Works and Transportation section. Higher asset specificity and higher contract 
management difficulty all lead to more outsourcing. The reason might be the use of 
privatization in this service area has become more commonplace and local governments 
may just follow the trend without fully evaluating the market characteristics.  
As a whole, the empirical results presented here shed some light on disentangling 
determinants that contribute to the use of outsourcing and specify hospitable situations 
for such practice. There are several measures that are particularly important. External 
stakeholders’ involvement is very robust across all the analyses, which makes it critical in 
implementing privatization at the local level. When outsourcing seems like a sound and 
viable option for a local government official, he/she should reach out and get more 
external stakeholders (i.e. potential service providers; professional consultants; service 
recipients/customers; managers in other local governments; citizen advisory committees; 
and state agencies, leagues, and associations) on board to help facilitate the whole 
process. Strong monitoring capacity is an area public officials should pay attention to if 
they are thinking about outsourcing some of their municipality’s services. There is a 
positive and direct link between the capacity that a city has to oversee contracts and 
ensure the quality of service outsourced and the use of private provision to provide 
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services. Although the revenue volatility measure fails to show statistical significance, a 
tight fiscal situation (higher debt burden and lower tax revenue) seems to trigger the use 
of outsourcing as well. Combining the findings identified in the literature and empirical 
results presented here, outsourcing should be considered as a viable option to cut costs 
and deal with financial uncertainty under the right circumstances. 
4.2. Future Research 
 
The dissertation provides several unique ways to survey the use of outsourcing at 
the local level in the U.S. There are some limitations that have been identified though. 
The immediate next step of the future research would be to address those limitations. 
First, chapter two explores the determinants that contribute to the use of outsourcing and 
identifies that spatial autocorrelation exists in local governments’ sourcing decisions. 
However, one drawback is that the study is based on aggregation of all the individual 
services at municipal level. Such aggregation may smooth out variations that exist at the 
service level. A finer analysis based on individual service or service groups should be 
able to help researchers and practitioners gain more insight on the matter.  
In addition, revenue volatility measures do not show much impact on the use of 
outsourcing. As identified above, one possible reason is that the method used to extract 
volatility measures is rough. Borrowing from corporate finance literature to construct a 
new revenue volatility measure is necessary.  
Because of the unavailability of the data, the analysis has failed to capture the 
impact of the recent economic recession. With the new privatization data due to come out 
soon, it would be particularly important to measure what are the impacts that recent the 
recession has had on the use of outsourcing. A direct survey to local government officials 
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to gather measures on asset specificity, contract management difficulty, and market 
competitiveness would also put an edge on the future research.  
Moreover, municipalities are facing a very hard time financially with increasingly 
tight resources. It is not realistic to solve the problem with a single solution or practice. 
Future research is likely needed to incorporate the use of outsourcing with a variety of 
other factors that may help municipalities to cope with financial instability and limited 
resources.  
Last but not least, the use of privatization is a worldwide phenomenon. So it should 
be treated as such. A comparison of the use of privatization in the U.S. and elsewhere 
should give more insight to anyone who is interested in the subject. In addition, as a 
rising economic power, China has just recently started to outsource its municipal 
services. I am particularly interested in comparing the use of outsourcing in the U.S. and 
China. This would be especially beneficial to Chinese practitioners since they virtually 
have no experience in such area.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Zhiwei Zhang 2013 
102 
 
Appendix A 
Table A1 Average Scores by Service and Metro Status: Asset Specificity, Contract Management Difficulty 
 Asset Specificity Contract Management Difficulty 
Service All Core Sub  Rural All Core Sub  Rural 
Residential waste collection 2.91 2.8 2.85 3.19 2.17 1.88 2.28 2.23 
Commercial waste collection 2.83 2.9 2.78 2.89 2.15 1.84 2.27 2.17 
Waste disposal 3.81 4.12 3.69 3.72 2.82 3.03 2.73 2.77 
Street repair 3.32 3.3 3.33 3.35 2.56 2.46 2.6 2.56 
Street/lot cleaning 2.4 2.33 2.38 2.51 1.94 1.89 1.93 2 
Snow plowing/sanding 2.7 2.35 2.7 3 2.37 2.23 2.42 2.38 
Traffic sign maintenance 3.6 3.46 3.71 3.47 2.61 2.49 2.65 2.65 
Parking meter maintenance 1.87 1.74 2.03 1.65 2.07 2.17 2.08 1.92 
Tree trimming/planting 2.61 2.54 2.62 2.66 2.34 2.29 2.36 2.34 
Cemeteries maintenance 2.26 1.91 2.14 2.87 2.07 1.97 2.13 2.06 
Inspection/code enforcement 3.94 3.88 3.92 4.06 3.43 3.53 3.46 3.23 
Lots/garages operation 2.18 1.97 2.27 2.23 2.04 2.27 2 1.84 
Bus system maintenance 3.18 3.17 3.36 2.79 2.91 3.14 2.98 2.44 
Paratransit system maintenance 3.1 3.21 3.05 3.05 2.92 3.03 2.96 2.62 
Airport operation 3.99 4.34 3.72 4.12 3.47 3.75 3.4 3.25 
Water distribution 4.45 4.54 4.45 4.35 3.5 3.63 3.55 3.19 
Water treatment 4.45 4.47 4.47 4.35 3.54 3.64 3.57 3.33 
Sewage collection/treatment 4.49 4.54 4.49 4.44 3.59 3.79 3.55 3.45 
Sludge disposal 3.7 3.86 3.7 3.53 2.93 2.97 3.08 2.48 
Hazardous materials disposal 4.14 4.21 4.2 3.93 3.56 3.59 3.6 3.41 
Electric utility management 4.2 4.27 4.19 4.14 3.59 3.8 3.67 3.09 
Gas utility management 4.11 4.25 4.16 3.83 3.55 3.82 3.59 3.05 
Utility meter reading  2.88 2.56 3 2.93 2.37 2.26 2.47 2.25 
Utility billing 3.03 2.86 3.03 3.24 2.45 2.37 2.52 2.37 
Crime prevention/patrol  4.07 4.1 3.99 4.26 3.89 4.18 3.95 3.4 
Police/fire communications  4.28 4.1 4.34 4.34 3.64 3.58 3.8 3.34 
Fire prevention/suppression  4.35 4.32 4.39 4.3 3.64 3.8 3.74 3.18 
Emergency medical service  4.4 4.42 4.37 4.47 3.42 3.47 3.5 3.13 
Ambulance service 4.11 4.08 4.11 4.15 3.17 3.06 3.29 2.96 
Traffic control/parking enforcement  2.91 2.64 2.96 3.13 2.77 2.55 3 2.43 
Vehicle towing and storage  2.23 2.19 2.23 2.29 2.14 2.03 2.18 2.16 
Sanitary inspection 3.24 3.47 3.16 3.21 2.93 3.19 2.82 2.9 
Insect/rodent control 2.74 2.68 2.73 2.88 2.44 2.5 2.37 2.54 
Animal control 2.98 2.97 2.96 3.03 2.83 2.79 2.81 2.94 
Animal shelter operation 3.1 2.97 3.15 3.13 2.69 2.64 2.66 2.81 
Daycare facilities operation 2.99 3.04 3 2.91 2.74 2.93 2.67 2.7 
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Table A1  (continued) 
Average Scores by Service and Metro Status: Asset Specificity, Contract Management 
Difficulty 
 Asset Specificity Contract Management Difficulty 
Service All Core Sub  Rural All Core Sub  Rural 
Child welfare programs 3.29 3.59 3.05 3.52 3.47 3.96 3.28 3.35 
Elderly programs 3 2.91 3.03 3.03 2.99 3.19 2.97 2.83 
Hospital operation/management 4.14 4.25 4.08 4.14 3.92 3.93 3.87 4.05 
Public health programs 3.66 3.87 3.49 3.81 3.6 3.63 3.61 3.56 
Drug/alcohol treatment programs 3.32 3.36 3.14 3.74 3.38 3.25 3.41 3.48 
Mental health programs operation  3.63 3.92 3.43 3.79 3.53 3.54 3.48 3.65 
Prisons/jails 4.09 4.41 3.84 4.32 3.73 4.21 3.56 3.57 
Homeless shelters operation 2.65 2.53 2.69 2.73 2.92 2.83 2.96 2.91 
Job training programs 3.09 3.19 2.93 3.39 3.05 2.94 3.03 3.26 
Welfare eligibility determination  2.94 3.07 2.68 3.38 3.11 3.11 3.07 3.22 
Recreation facilities maintenance 3.3 3.4 3.12 3.58 2.83 2.9 2.79 2.83 
Parks landscaping/maintenance  2.9 3.03 2.71 3.19 2.47 2.49 2.48 2.44 
Convention centers/auditoriums 
operation  
3.27 3.55 3.19 3.13 3.02 3.07 3.02 2.96 
Cultural/arts programs operation  2.79 2.69 2.72 3.18 2.87 2.91 2.87 2.76 
Libraries operation 3.53 3.63 3.45 3.61 3.07 3.17 2.99 3.15 
Museums operation 3.39 3.52 3.34 3.38 2.94 3.1 2.95 2.7 
Buildings/grounds maintenance 2.94 2.93 2.88 3.11 2.45 2.4 2.41 2.59 
Building security 2.78 2.5 2.82 3.03 2.37 2.24 2.43 2.38 
Heavy equipment maintenance  3.66 3.51 3.71 3.71 2.71 2.85 2.63 2.71 
Emergency vehicles maintenance 3.74 3.68 3.77 3.72 2.7 2.93 2.64 2.56 
All other vehicles maintenance 3.39 3.28 3.4 3.48 2.61 2.75 2.56 2.58 
Payroll 3.33 3.15 3.27 3.69 2.37 2.4 2.31 2.5 
Tax bill processing 3.23 3.28 3.15 3.37 2.56 2.61 2.46 2.73 
Tax assessing 3.72 3.77 3.64 3.86 3.02 3.09 3.08 2.79 
Data processing 3.75 3.71 3.7 3.94 2.91 3.03 2.84 2.94 
Delinquent tax collection 3 2.86 2.94 3.29 2.53 2.53 2.43 2.77 
Title records/plat map maintenance 3.45 3.53 3.32 3.62 2.8 2.69 2.8 2.9 
Legal services 4.2 4.15 4.17 4.34 2.9 3.15 2.83 2.79 
Secretarial services 2.61 2.38 2.52 3.09 2.14 1.97 2.21 2.18 
Personnel services 3.4 3.17 3.35 3.76 2.78 2.79 2.76 2.82 
Public relations/public information 3.1 3.05 3.05 3.32 2.77 2.74 2.74 2.9 
ICMA Service Characteristics survey 2007. N=164 places (41 metro core, 87 suburban, 36 rural). Scores 
ranked from low (1) to high (5). 
Source: Hefetz, A., and M. E. Warner. 2012. Contracting or Public Delivery? The Importance of Service, 
Market, and Management Characteristics. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 22 
(2):289-317; p.309-10 
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Table A2 Average Scores by Service and Metro Status: Market Competition 
Service 
Market Competition 
All Core Suburban  Rural 
Residential waste collection 2.59 2.66 2.82 1.94 
Commercial waste collection 2.85 3.1 2.95 2.33 
Waste disposal 1.69 1.59 1.92 1.28 
Street repair 2.79 3.16 2.92 1.97 
Street/lot cleaning 2.01 2.42 2.2 1.09 
Snow plowing/sanding 1.76 1.9 1.9 1.32 
Traffic sign maintenance 1.66 1.72 1.88 0.97 
Parking meter maintenance 1.16 1.14 1.5 0.41 
Tree trimming/planting 2.91 3 3.09 2.37 
Cemeteries maintenance 1.63 1.84 1.72 1.23 
Inspection/code enforcement 1.07 1.03 1.22 0.74 
Lots/garages operation 1.83 2.09 2.1 0.88 
Bus system maintenance 1.04 1.34 1.13 0.44 
Paratransit system maintenance 1.23 1.38 1.38 0.62 
Airport operation 0.68 0.52 1 0.22 
Water distribution 0.79 0.78 0.94 0.45 
Water treatment 0.88 0.83 1.08 0.39 
Sewage collection/treatment 0.67 0.71 0.78 0.35 
Sludge disposal 1.28 1.76 1.24 0.86 
Hazardous materials disposal 1.51 1.66 1.69 0.85 
Electric utility management 1.43 1.37 1.49 1.36 
Gas utility management 1.4 1.32 1.5 1.23 
Utility meter reading  1.35 1.55 1.43 0.89 
Utility billing 1.54 1.91 1.59 0.96 
Crime prevention/patrol  0.23 0.34 0.27 0.03 
Police/fire communications  0.57 0.65 0.71 0.14 
Fire prevention/suppression  0.41 0.33 0.41 0.52 
Emergency medical service  1.23 1.16 1.32 1.1 
Ambulance service 1.86 1.54 1.33  
Traffic control/parking enforcement  0.61 0.7 0.73 0.19 
Vehicle towing and storage  3.18 3.42 3.17 2.94 
Sanitary inspection 0.9 0.61 1.26 0.32 
Insect/rodent control 2.3 2.61 2.5 1.33 
Animal control 0.82 0.61 1.1 0.36 
Animal shelter operation 1.28 1.4 1.36 0.97 
Daycare facilities operation 3.44 3.7 3.3 3.52 
Child welfare programs 1.36 0.96 1.76 0.83 
Elderly programs 2.04 2.68 2.09 1.21 
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Table A2 Average Scores by Service and Metro Status: Market Competition (continued) 
Service 
Market Competition 
All Core Suburban  Rural 
Hospital operation/management 2.32 2.52 2.6 1.41 
Public health programs 1.21 1.28 1.39 0.73 
Drug/alcohol treatment programs 2.66 3.15 2.66 2.13 
Mental health programs operation  2.05 2.52 2.09 1.46 
Prisons/jails 0.84 0.73 1.15 0.25 
Homeless shelters operation 2 2.38 2.02 1.45 
Job training programs 2.01 2.26 2.03 1.63 
Welfare eligibility determination  0.81 0.7 1.07 0.33 
Recreation facilities maintenance 1.51 1.64 1.75 0.81 
Parks landscaping/maintenance  2.26 2.38 2.6 1.31 
Convention centers/auditoriums operation  1.67 2.07 1.84 0.79 
Cultural/arts programs operation  2.35 2.71 2.24 2.14 
Libraries operation 0.6 0.74 0.65 0.32 
Museums operation 1.63 1.7 1.68 1.38 
Buildings/grounds maintenance 2.53 2.92 2.64 1.8 
Building security 2.26 2.89 2.51 0.94 
Heavy equipment maintenance  2.08 2.41 2.24 1.31 
Emergency vehicles maintenance 2.08 2.48 2.18 1.34 
All other vehicles maintenance 2.44 2.77 2.42 2.09 
Payroll 1.96 2.35 2.07 1.21 
Tax bill processing 1.04 1.06 1.24 0.52 
Tax assessing 0.71 0.68 0.81 0.53 
Data processing 2.28 2.5 2.58 1.26 
Delinquent tax collection 1.68 2.32 1.83 0.63 
Title records/plat map maintenance 0.78 0.87 0.92 0.4 
Legal services 3.28 3.59 3.37 2.71 
Secretarial services 2.68 2.86 2.76 2.29 
Personnel services 2.03 2.49 2 1.62 
Public relations/public information 2.31 2.55 2.44 1.63 
ICMA Service Characteristics survey 2007. N=164 places (41 metro core, 87 suburban, 36 rural). 
Competition ranked from no alternate providers (0), and one= one alternative provider, two = two, three = 
three, and four = four or more alternative providers. 
Source: Hefetz, A., and M. E. Warner. 2012. Contracting or Public Delivery? The Importance of Service, 
Market, and Management Characteristics. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 22 
(2):289-317; p.311-12 
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Appendix B Factor Loading Matrix for TCE Variables 
 
Principle Components Analysis 
 
Asset Specificity 
Contract 
Management 
Difficulty 
Market 
Competition 
Factor1 Factor2 Factor1 Factor2 Factor1 Factor2 
Residential waste collection 0.97 -0.24 -0.78 0.63 1.00 -0.09 
Commercial waste collection 0.37 -0.93 -0.69 0.72 0.97 0.25 
Waste disposal -0.48 -0.87 0.77 -0.64 0.93 -0.36 
Street repair 0.92 0.39 -0.64 0.77 0.97 0.25 
Street/lot cleaning 1.00 -0.07 -0.92 -0.40 0.98 0.21 
Snow plowing/sanding 0.95 0.30 -0.71 0.71 1.00 0.06 
Traffic sign maintenance -0.39 0.92 -0.86 0.50 1.00 -0.08 
Parking meter maintenance -0.56 0.83 0.91 0.41 0.98 -0.21 
Tree trimming/planting 0.87 0.49 -0.64 0.77 1.00 -0.04 
Cemeteries maintenance 0.99 -0.12 -0.49 0.87 0.97 0.25 
Inspection/code enforcement 0.99 -0.14 0.84 0.55 0.96 -0.27 
Lots/garages operation 0.42 0.91 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.06 
Bus system maintenance -0.80 0.59 0.83 0.55 0.96 0.29 
Paratransit system maintenance -0.56 -0.83 0.80 0.60 1.00 0.06 
Airport operation 0.15 -0.99 0.99 -0.11 0.90 -0.44 
Water distribution -0.98 -0.20 0.80 0.59 0.98 -0.21 
Water treatment -0.94 0.35 0.83 0.55 0.97 -0.24 
Sewage collection/treatment -0.97 -0.24 0.99 -0.12 1.00 -0.07 
Sludge disposal -0.98 -0.22 0.57 0.82 0.71 0.71 
Hazardous materials disposal -0.95 0.32 0.66 0.75 1.00 0.03 
Electric utility management 1.00  0.90  0.85  
Gas utility management 0.88  0.84  0.93  
Utility meter reading  -0.67  0.88  0.94  
Utility billing -0.98  0.87  0.85  
Crime prevention/patrol  0.99 0.10 0.94 0.35 -1.00  
Police/fire communications  -0.21 0.98 0.94 -0.35 1.00  
Fire prevention/suppression  -0.98 0.19 0.99 0.14 1.00  
Emergency medical service  1.00 0.02 1.00 -0.02 1.00  
Ambulance service 0.59 0.80 0.86 -0.50 -1.00  
Traffic control/parking enforcement  0.28 0.96 0.83 -0.56 1.00  
Vehicle towing and storage  0.63 0.78 -0.02 -1.00 -1.00  
Sanitary inspection 0.40 -0.92 -0.08 1.00 1.00  
Insect/rodent control 0.77 0.64 -0.84 0.55 -1.00  
Animal control 0.95 0.32 -0.99 -0.17 1.00  
Animal shelter operation -0.34 0.94 -0.99 -0.16 -1.00  
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Daycare facilities operation -0.72 -0.69 0.04 1.00 -1.00  
Child welfare programs 0.91 -0.42 0.06 1.00 1.00  
Elderly programs -0.21 0.98 0.68 0.73 -1.00  
Hospital operation/management 0.60 -0.80 -0.97 0.23 1.00  
Public health programs 0.90 -0.44 0.94 0.34 1.00  
Drug/alcohol treatment programs 0.99 0.14 -0.57 -0.82 -1.00  
Mental health programs operation  0.86 -0.51 -0.97 0.24 -1.00  
Prisons/jails 0.90 -0.44 0.16 0.99 1.00  
Homeless shelters operation 0.05 1.00 0.28 -0.96 -1.00  
Job training programs 1.00 -0.03 -0.94 -0.33 -1.00  
Welfare eligibility determination  1.00 -0.02 -0.99 0.17 1.00  
Recreation facilities maintenance 0.99  0.30 0.95 1.00  
Parks landscaping/maintenance  1.00  0.95 -0.32 0.99  
Convention centers/auditoriums 
operation  0.22 
 
1.00 0.01 0.98 
 
Cultural/arts programs operation  0.05 1.00 0.98  0.76  
Libraries operation 0.82 0.57 -0.58  0.98  
Museums operation 1.00 -0.06 0.95  0.94  
Buildings/grounds maintenance 0.86 0.52 0.78 0.62 1.00 -0.08 
Building security 0.08 1.00 -0.66 0.76 1.00 -0.02 
Heavy equipment maintenance  -0.47 0.88 0.74 -0.67 1.00 0.02 
Emergency vehicles maintenance -0.91 0.41 0.10 -0.99 1.00 -0.10 
All other vehicles maintenance 0.09 1.00 0.50 -0.87 0.90 -0.44 
Payroll 0.59 0.81 0.97 0.23 1.00 -0.08 
Tax bill processing 0.97 0.23 0.99 0.16 0.93 0.37 
Tax assessing 0.97 0.23 -0.79 -0.61 0.85 0.53 
Data processing 0.77 0.64 0.85 -0.53 0.98 0.21 
Delinquent tax collection 0.62 0.78 0.93 0.37 0.99 -0.13 
Title records/plat map maintenance 0.99 0.15 0.30 0.95 0.97 0.24 
Legal services 0.68 0.73 0.25 -0.97 1.00 -0.08 
Secretarial services 0.61 0.79 -0.52 0.86 1.00 0.00 
Personnel services 0.50 0.86 0.98 0.21 0.86 -0.51 
Public relations/public information 0.75 0.66 0.81 0.59 1.00 0.06 
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Appendix C 
Table C1: Summary Statistics of Asset Specificity and Contract Management Difficulty  
 
Asset Specificity Contract Management Difficulty 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Residential waste collection 2.94 0.16 2.80 3.19 2.20 0.15 1.88 2.28 
Commercial waste collection 2.83 0.06 2.78 2.90 2.17 0.15 1.84 2.27 
Waste disposal 3.77 0.16 3.69 4.12 2.79 0.11 2.73 3.03 
Street repair 3.33 0.02 3.30 3.35 2.56 0.05 2.46 2.60 
Street/lot cleaning 2.41 0.07 2.33 2.51 1.94 0.04 1.89 2.00 
Snow plowing/sanding 2.73 0.22 2.35 3.00 2.38 0.07 2.23 2.42 
Traffic sign maintenance 3.59 0.12 3.46 3.71 2.62 0.06 2.49 2.65 
Parking meter maintenance 1.87 0.18 1.65 2.03 2.05 0.09 1.92 2.17 
Tree trimming/planting 2.62 0.04 2.54 2.66 2.34 0.03 2.29 2.36 
Cemeteries maintenance 2.32 0.37 1.91 2.87 2.08 0.06 1.97 2.13 
Inspection/code enforcement 3.96 0.07 3.88 4.06 3.40 0.12 3.23 3.53 
Lots/garages operation 2.21 0.11 1.97 2.27 2.00 0.14 1.84 2.27 
Bus system maintenance 3.15 0.25 2.79 3.36 2.84 0.27 2.44 3.14 
Paratransit system maintenance 3.08 0.06 3.05 3.21 2.87 0.17 2.62 3.03 
Airport operation 3.95 0.25 3.72 4.34 3.41 0.17 3.25 3.75 
Water distribution 4.44 0.06 4.35 4.54 3.45 0.18 3.19 3.63 
Water treatment 4.43 0.06 4.35 4.47 3.51 0.12 3.33 3.64 
Sewage collection/treatment 4.48 0.03 4.44 4.54 3.56 0.11 3.45 3.79 
Sludge disposal 3.68 0.11 3.53 3.86 2.88 0.27 2.48 3.08 
Hazardous materials disposal 4.12 0.13 3.93 4.21 3.54 0.09 3.41 3.60 
Electric utility management 4.19 0.04 4.14 4.27 3.52 0.29 3.09 3.80 
Gas utility management 4.08 0.17 3.83 4.25 3.47 0.29 3.05 3.82 
Utility meter reading  2.90 0.16 2.56 3.00 2.37 0.11 2.25 2.47 
Utility billing 3.06 0.13 2.86 3.24 2.45 0.07 2.37 2.52 
Crime prevention/patrol  4.09 0.12 3.99 4.26 3.82 0.29 3.40 4.18 
Police/fire communications  4.30 0.09 4.10 4.34 3.62 0.20 3.34 3.80 
Fire prevention/suppression  4.35 0.04 4.30 4.39 3.58 0.27 3.18 3.80 
Emergency medical service  4.41 0.04 4.37 4.47 3.38 0.17 3.13 3.50 
Ambulance service 4.12 0.02 4.08 4.15 3.15 0.15 2.96 3.29 
Traffic control/parking enforcement  2.96 0.16 2.64 3.13 2.75 0.27 2.43 3.00 
Vehicle towing and storage  2.24 0.04 2.19 2.29 2.15 0.05 2.03 2.18 
Sanitary inspection 3.23 0.11 3.16 3.47 2.91 0.13 2.82 3.19 
Insect/rodent control 2.77 0.08 2.68 2.88 2.44 0.08 2.37 2.54 
Animal control 2.98 0.03 2.96 3.03 2.85 0.06 2.79 2.94 
Animal shelter operation 3.11 0.07 2.97 3.15 2.70 0.07 2.64 2.81 
Daycare facilities operation 2.98 0.05 2.91 3.04 2.72 0.09 2.67 2.93 
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Child welfare programs 3.28 0.25 3.05 3.59 3.42 0.25 3.28 3.96 
Elderly programs 3.01 0.05 2.91 3.03 2.97 0.12 2.83 3.19 
Hospital operation/management 4.13 0.06 4.08 4.25 3.93 0.08 3.87 4.05 
Public health programs 3.65 0.17 3.49 3.87 3.60 0.03 3.56 3.63 
Drug/alcohol treatment programs 3.36 0.26 3.14 3.74 3.40 0.08 3.25 3.48 
Mental health programs operation  3.62 0.21 3.43 3.92 3.54 0.07 3.48 3.65 
Prisons/jails 4.08 0.26 3.84 4.41 3.67 0.24 3.56 4.21 
Homeless shelters operation 2.67 0.07 2.53 2.73 2.92 0.05 2.83 2.96 
Job training programs 3.11 0.20 2.93 3.39 3.08 0.12 2.94 3.26 
Welfare eligibility determination  2.96 0.31 2.68 3.38 3.12 0.07 3.07 3.22 
Recreation facilities maintenance 3.31 0.21 3.12 3.58 2.82 0.04 2.79 2.90 
Parks landscaping/maintenance  2.91 0.22 2.71 3.19 2.47 0.02 2.44 2.49 
Convention centers/auditoriums 
operation  3.23 0.15 3.13 3.55 3.01 0.04 2.96 3.07 
Cultural/arts programs operation  2.85 0.22 2.69 3.18 2.84 0.06 2.76 2.91 
Libraries operation 3.53 0.08 3.45 3.63 3.07 0.08 2.99 3.17 
Museums operation 3.38 0.06 3.34 3.52 2.90 0.14 2.70 3.10 
Buildings/grounds maintenance 2.96 0.10 2.88 3.11 2.46 0.08 2.40 2.59 
Building security 2.83 0.18 2.50 3.03 2.38 0.07 2.24 2.43 
Heavy equipment maintenance  3.68 0.08 3.51 3.71 2.69 0.08 2.63 2.85 
Emergency vehicles maintenance 3.74 0.03 3.68 3.77 2.67 0.13 2.56 2.93 
All other vehicles maintenance 3.40 0.07 3.28 3.48 2.60 0.07 2.56 2.75 
Payroll 3.38 0.21 3.15 3.69 2.38 0.08 2.31 2.50 
Tax bill processing 3.24 0.10 3.15 3.37 2.57 0.12 2.46 2.73 
Tax assessing 3.73 0.10 3.64 3.86 2.99 0.13 2.79 3.09 
Data processing 3.77 0.11 3.70 3.94 2.90 0.07 2.84 3.03 
Delinquent tax collection 3.03 0.17 2.86 3.29 2.55 0.15 2.43 2.77 
Title records/plat map maintenance 3.45 0.14 3.32 3.62 2.81 0.07 2.69 2.90 
Legal services 4.22 0.08 4.15 4.34 2.87 0.13 2.79 3.15 
Secretarial services 2.67 0.28 2.38 3.09 2.16 0.09 1.97 2.21 
Personnel services 3.44 0.22 3.17 3.76 2.78 0.03 2.76 2.82 
Public relations/public information 3.13 0.12 3.05 3.32 2.79 0.07 2.74 2.90 
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Table C2: Summary Statistics of Market Competition 
  
Market Competition 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Residential waste collection 2.53 0.39 1.94 2.82 
Commercial waste collection 2.79 0.31 2.33 3.10 
Waste disposal 1.67 0.28 1.28 1.92 
Street repair 2.67 0.47 1.97 3.16 
Street/lot cleaning 1.90 0.54 1.09 2.42 
Snow plowing/sanding 1.72 0.27 1.32 1.90 
Traffic sign maintenance 1.58 0.40 0.97 1.88 
Parking meter maintenance 1.11 0.48 0.41 1.50 
Tree trimming/planting 2.86 0.32 2.37 3.09 
Cemeteries maintenance 1.59 0.24 1.23 1.84 
Inspection/code enforcement 1.04 0.21 0.74 1.22 
Lots/garages operation 1.73 0.56 0.88 2.10 
Bus system maintenance 0.96 0.35 0.44 1.34 
Paratransit system maintenance 1.15 0.35 0.62 1.38 
Airport operation 0.68 0.35 0.22 1.00 
Water distribution 0.76 0.21 0.45 0.94 
Water treatment 0.83 0.30 0.39 1.08 
Sewage collection/treatment 0.64 0.19 0.35 0.78 
Sludge disposal 1.21 0.30 0.86 1.76 
Hazardous materials disposal 1.43 0.38 0.85 1.69 
Electric utility management 1.43 0.06 1.36 1.49 
Gas utility management 1.39 0.12 1.23 1.50 
Utility meter reading  1.29 0.27 0.89 1.55 
Utility billing 1.45 0.35 0.96 1.91 
Crime prevention/patrol  0.21 0.12 0.03 0.34 
Police/fire communications  0.53 0.26 0.14 0.71 
Fire prevention/suppression  0.43 0.07 0.33 0.52 
Emergency medical service  1.23 0.10 1.10 1.32 
Ambulance service 1.38 0.09 1.33 1.54 
Traffic control/parking enforcement  0.56 0.25 0.19 0.73 
Vehicle towing and storage  3.14 0.16 2.94 3.42 
Sanitary inspection 0.86 0.43 0.32 1.26 
Insect/rodent control 2.16 0.55 1.33 2.61 
Animal control 0.79 0.33 0.36 1.10 
Animal shelter operation 1.25 0.18 0.97 1.40 
Daycare facilities operation 3.44 0.15 3.30 3.70 
Child welfare programs 1.34 0.44 0.83 1.76 
Elderly programs 1.92 0.52 1.21 2.68 
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Hospital operation/management 2.23 0.54 1.41 2.60 
Public health programs 1.17 0.29 0.73 1.39 
Drug/alcohol treatment programs 2.58 0.35 2.13 3.15 
Mental health programs operation  1.97 0.37 1.46 2.52 
Prisons/jails 0.81 0.40 0.25 1.15 
Homeless shelters operation 1.91 0.33 1.45 2.38 
Job training programs 1.95 0.23 1.63 2.26 
Welfare eligibility determination  0.78 0.33 0.33 1.07 
Recreation facilities maintenance 1.45 0.42 0.81 1.75 
Parks landscaping/maintenance  2.17 0.57 1.31 2.60 
Convention centers/auditoriums operation  1.56 0.52 0.79 2.07 
Cultural/arts programs operation  2.29 0.20 2.14 2.71 
Libraries operation 0.57 0.17 0.32 0.74 
Museums operation 1.59 0.14 1.38 1.70 
Buildings/grounds maintenance 2.43 0.43 1.80 2.92 
Building security 2.10 0.78 0.94 2.89 
Heavy equipment maintenance  1.99 0.45 1.31 2.41 
Emergency vehicles maintenance 1.98 0.43 1.34 2.48 
All other vehicles maintenance 2.38 0.23 2.09 2.77 
Payroll 1.86 0.44 1.21 2.35 
Tax bill processing 0.99 0.32 0.52 1.24 
Tax assessing 0.70 0.12 0.53 0.81 
Data processing 2.17 0.60 1.26 2.58 
Delinquent tax collection 1.55 0.63 0.63 2.32 
Title records/plat map maintenance 0.75 0.23 0.40 0.92 
Legal services 3.21 0.34 2.71 3.59 
Secretarial services 2.63 0.23 2.29 2.86 
Personnel services 1.97 0.29 1.62 2.49 
Public relations/public information 2.21 0.39 1.63 2.55 
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Appendix D Correlation Matrix for TCE Factor Scores by Service Area 
 
Table D1: Correlation Matrix for TCE Factor Scores in Public Works/Transportation  
Public Works Asset_1 Asset_2 Cont_1 Cont_2 Mark_1 Mark_2 
Asset_1 1.00      
Asset_2 0.00 1.00     
Contract_1 -0.92 0.40 1.00    
Contract_2 0.40 0.92 0.00 1.00   
Market_1 -0.29 0.96 0.65 0.76 1.00  
Market_2 -0.96 -0.29 0.76 -0.65 0.00 1.00 
  
 
Table D2: Correlation Matrix for TCE Factor Scores in Public Utilities 
Public Utility Asset Contract Market 
Asset 1.00   
Contract 0.57 1.00  
Market 0.63 0.99 1.00 
 
 
Table D3: Correlation Matrix for TCE Factor Scores in Public Health and Safety 
Public Safety Asset_1 Asset_2 Cont_1 Cont_2 Mark 
Asset_1 1.00     
Asset_2 0.00 1.00    
Contract_1 -1.00 1.00 1.00   
Contract_2 1.00 -1.00 0.00 1.00  
Market -1.00 1.00 1.00 -1.00 1.00 
 
 
Table D4: Correlation Matrix for TCE Factor Scores in Parks and Recreation 
Parks Asset Cont_1 Cont_2 Market 
Asset 1.00    
Contract_1 -0.61 1.00   
Contract_2 0.79 0.00 1.00  
Market -0.82 0.96 -0.29 1.00 
 
 
 
Table D5: Correlation Matrix for TCE Factor Scores in Cultural and Arts Programs 
 Asset_1 Asset_2 Contract Market 
Asset_1 1.00    
Asset_2 0.00 1.00   
Contract -0.01 -1.00 1.00  
Market 0.29 -0.96 0.96 1.00 
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Table D6: Correlation Matrix for TCE Factor Scores in Support Services 
 Asset_1 Asset_2 Cont_1 Cont_2 Mark_1 Mark_2 
Asset_1 1.00      
Asset_2 0.00 1.00     
Contract_1 0.83 0.55 1.00    
Contract_2 0.55 -0.83 0.00 1.00   
Market_1 0.10 -0.99 -0.46 0.89 1.00  
Market_1 -0.99 -0.10 -0.89 -0.46 0.00 1.00 
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